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THE NBA DRESS CODE AND OTHER FASHION FAUX PAS
UNDER TITLE VII
MARK R. BANDSUCH, SJ.*
I. INTRODUCTION
Sports have always provided a unique glimpse into the socio-
logical soul of America - reflecting current social dynamics while
simultaneously serving as an agent of significant social change. For
example, professional sports excluded African-Americans from
white teams and leagues for decades before becoming one of the
earliest sources of equal rights when it began to integrate athletic
competition. Jesse Owens defeated the Nazi nation's claim of racial
superiority by winning four gold medals in the 1936 Olympic
Games and Jackie Robinson paved the way for integration in athlet-
ics, employment, education and public accommodations when he
became the first black baseball player in the all-white Major League
in 1947. Parallels between sports and society are still prevalent to-
day, with athletes from numerous nations achieving success at all
levels in a manner reflecting similar advances of employee diversity
in the workplace. The influence of modern athletes on the work-
place can even be seen in the assorted attire, trend-setting hair-
styles, bountiful body art and extensive "bling-bling"' that adorns
the fields and factories, as well as the locker rooms and
boardrooms.
Unfortunately, not all parallels are positive, as evidenced by the
very low number of African-American coaches and executives in
professional sports mirroring a similar dearth in upper-level man-
agement among corporations. Similarly, the previous freedom sur-
* Assistant Professor of Business Law, College of Business Administration,
Loyola Marymount University.
1. Minya Oh, "Bling Bling" Added to Oxford English Dictionary, MTV, Apr. 30,
2003, http://www.mtv.com/news/articles/1471629/20030430/bg.jhtml?head-
lines=true (noting definition of phrase "bling bling").
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rounding workplace attire has been replaced by employee dress
codes and other appearance rules in both businesses and profes-
sional sports. The latest example in sports is the "Business Casual"
Dress Code for National Basketball Association ("NBA") players,
which among other things, prohibits players from wearing shorts,
chains and throwback jerseys. 2 The particular prescriptions and
prohibitions of these different dress codes, appearance policies,
and grooming rules have raised concerns about a "second genera-
tion" of employment discrimination referred to as "trait
discrimination. ''3
Parts II and III of this article look at the general authority pos-
sessed by employers of business and by commissioners of profes-
sional sports organizations to design and implement appearance
policies. Parts IV and V turn to Title VII for an analysis of the dis-
criminatory dimensions of dress codes and grooming guidelines,
with a focus on the NBA Dress Code. Parts IV and V also investigate
the challenges Title VII faces in adequately addressing the adverse
impact, cognitive bias and "trait discrimination" inherent in certain
appearance policies. This article then offers correctives to Title
VII's analytical framework so that it may more effectively address
these recent manifestations of appearance discrimination, may
more fully promote equal employment opportunities and may
more completely cultivate the social goals behind the Civil Rights
Act.
II. AUTHORITY OF EMPLOYERS AND COMMISSIONERS
Employers, whether of superstar athletes or minimum wage
workers, have traditionally enjoyed vast authority and autonomy
over their employees' behaviors and appearance. 4 Dress codes and
grooming policies are two of the many forms that workplace rules
may take when creating and describing the relative rights and du-
2. NBA Player Dress Code, http://www.nba.com/news/playerdresscode_05
1017.html (last visited Oct. 9, 2008) (stating NBA Dress Code).
3. Susan Sturm, Second Generation Employment Discrimination: A Structural Ap-
proach, 101 COLUM. L. REv. 458, 468-74 (2001) (claiming trait discrimination may is
new form of employment discrimination). "'Second generation' claims involve so-
cial practices and patterns of interaction among groups within the workplace that,
over time, exclude nondominant groups." Id. at 460; see also Kimberly A. Yuracko,
Trait Discrimination as Race Discrimination: An Argument About Assimilation, 74 GEO.
WASH. L. REv. 365, 366, 369-70. (2006) (noting trait discrimination is akin to race
discrimination).
4. SeeJay M. Feinman, The Development of the Employment at Will Rule, 20 Am. J.
LEcAL HIsT. 118, 126-27 (1976) (referring to HORACE G. WOOD, MASTER AND SER-
vANT, § 134 272-73 (1877)) (describing employer's authority over workplace).
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ties in the employer-employee relationship. Courts generally have
upheld clothing regulations that have required employees to wear
suits, dress in accordance with gender, be clean shaven, cut their
hair, remove or cover tattoos, avoid certain hair styles, restrict jew-
elry or associated piercings, and even act and talk in a certain man-
ner (i.e., "conservative"). 5
Owners of professional sports franchises are endowed with the
same rights as owners and employers of traditional organizations
and businesses. The policy can originate with individual player con-
tracts with the team (like Johnny Damon's requirement to shave in
order to wear Yankee pinstripes). Grooming policies and dress
codes can also stem from a collective bargaining agreement
("CBA") between all players and the league through the commis-
sioner (like the NBA Dress Code).
A. Commissioners' Authority
Each CBA addresses, to varying degrees of specificity, the com-
missioner's powers, when those powers are exercisable, and how
they are procedurally invoked.6 The team owners of each league
have also granted their respective commissioner the extensive au-
thority to act in the best interests of the game.7 For example, the
NFL commissioner may exercise his disciplinary powers against vio-
lent or criminal conduct that "is unacceptable and constitutes con-
duct detrimental to the integrity and public confidence in the
5. See, e.g., Riggs v. City of Fort Worth, 229 F. Supp. 2d 572 (N.D. Tex. 2002)
(upholding employer decision to require employee to wear long pants and shirt to
cover tattoos); Cloutier v. Costco Wholesale Corp., 390 F.3d 126 (1st Cir. 2004)
(rejecting employees request to be exempt from employer's ban on body pierc-
ings); see also Michael W. Fox, Piercings, Makeup, and Appearance: The Changing Face
of Discrimination Law, 69 TEX. B.J. 564, 564 (2006) (describing increased number of
Civil Rights cases attempting to expand protected categories).
6. NBA CONSTITUTION (MIscoNDcT), art. 35 (a)-(d) (2005), http://www.
nbpa.com/cba-exhibits/exhibitA-excerpt.php (last visited Oct. 15, 2008); see also
Matthew B. Pachman, Limits on the Discretionary Powers of Professional Sports Commis-
sioners: A Historical and Legal Analysis of Issues Raised by the Pete Rose Controversy, 76
VA. L. Riv. 1409, 1411 (1990) (arguing for balance between respecting league gov-
ernance and preventing commissioners from unlawfully restricting player rights).
7. See Pachman, supra note 6, at 1414, 1415, 1417 n.55 (describing origin of
league commissioner as response to Black Sox scandal of 1919, in which profes-
sional baseball players allegedly took money to fix World Series). Judge Kenesaw
Mountain Landis agreed to serve as the first commissioner of Major League Base-
ball, but only upon receiving immense authority to make and enforce decisions "in
the best interests of the game" - which included the power to levy fines and pun-
ishments upon players and owners alike (without limitation) and to be the final
arbiter of all disputes (with no right of appeal to the courts). Id. at 1415. The
NBA similarly appointed commissioner endowed with extensive powers in 1949.
See id. at 1417 n.55.
2009]
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National Football League."8 The NBA has also empowered its com-
missioner with the authority to punish players "guilty of conduct
that does not conform to the standards of morality or fair play."9
The courts and the National Labor Relations Board ("NLRB") have
upheld these broad powers and have deferred to the owners' intent
"to endow the commissioner with all the attributes of a benevolent
but absolute despot and all the disciplinary powers of the proverbial
"pater familias" - and have even given the CBA precedence over
league charters and constitutions.10
B. Limitations to Authority
Pursuant to his authority under the six-year NBA CBA, in Octo-
ber 2005, the NBA Commissioner David Stern first implemented
the NBA Dress Code. This is significant because it subjected the
NBA Dress Code to legal challenges under contract theory (which
includes collective bargaining agreements), public policy (rooted
primarily in statutory regulations) and implied covenants of good
faith and fair dealing.1 Employment relationships could be termi-
nated in violation of any of these three, leading to a possible claim
for wrongful discharge or unjust dismissal.' 2
For example, "the National Labor Relations Board has held
that appearance codes are 'terms and conditions of employment'
within the meaning of the NLRA and thus 'mandatory subjects of
8. NFL Personal Conduct Policy (2007), available at http://sports.espn.go.com/
nfl/news/story?id=2798214 (listing punishable behavior for NFL and team
employees).
9. NBA CONSTITUTION, supra note 6, at art. 35 (a)-(d) (making punishable
"conduct ... [that] is prejudicial or detrimental to or against the best interests of
the Association or the game of basketball").
10. Milwaukee American Ass'n v. Landis, 49 F.2d 298, 299 (N.D. 111. 1931)
(holding commissioner had power to negate contract between two teams); accord
Charles 0. Finley & Co., Inc. v. Kuhn, 569 F.2d 527 (7th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439
U.S. 876 (1978) (holding commissioner's authority is not bound by major league
rules or moral turpitude); see also Pachman, supra note 6, at 1418-19 (stating that
collective bargaining agreements should and must take precedence in dispute
resolution).
11. See Michael J. Yelnosky, What Do Unions Do About Appearance Codes?, 14
DuKEJ. GENDER L. & POL'Y 521, 522 (2007) (showing state action may be brought
for breach of implied covenant of good faith); Charles J. Muhl, The Employment-at-
will Doctrine: Three Major Exceptions, 124 MONTHLY LAB. REv. 3, 3-4 (Jan. 2001) (ex-
plaining that implied covenants of good faith and fair dealing as an exception to
the employment-at-will). A minority of states (eleven) as of October, 2000, includ-
ing California, Nevada and Alaska, read a covenant of good faith or fair dealing
into all employment relationships. Id. at 4.
12. See Muhl, supra note 11, at 3-4 (explaining terminating employment agree-
ments for these reasons can lead to litigation).
[Vol. 16: p. I
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bargaining.'- 1 3 Therefore, the employer's (and NBA Commis-
sioner's) unilateral implementation of a dress code without explicit
good faith bargaining arguably violates fundamental tenets of labor
law. 14 The NLRB has held as much in other grooming policy
cases.15 In fact, the NFL recently refrained from requiring players
to cut their hair a certain length without negotiations because the
NFL's previous CBA "expressly prohibited the imposition of disci-
pline based on facial hair or hair length." 16
The NBA and other employers often respond that the union
either consented to such changes or waived the right to negotiate
over it.1 7 They support their position with the broad powers
granted to the commissioner in the "best interests of the game" pro-
vision of the CBA, as well as the stipulation in "every player's con-
tract which states that the player agrees to be "neatly and fully
attired in public." 8 Public policy does, however, preclude the em-
ployer and union from agreeing to eliminate certain statutorily
guaranteed rights or similarly imposed responsibilities, but not all.
For example, a CBA can both relinquish the right to strike.' 9 As to
equal employment opportunity laws and the appearance codes they
cover, the Supreme Court has explicitly held that CBA's cannot
13. Yelnosky, supra note 11, at 523 n.15 (quoting Crittenton Hospital, 342
N.L.R.B. No. 67 (2004)); see also 29 U.S.C. § 158(a) (5) (2000) (declaring it an
unfair labor practice for an employer "to refuse to bargain collectively with the
representatives of his employees .... ").
14. See Yelnosky, supra note 11, at 523 n.17 (citing Pub. Serv. Co., 337 N.L.R.B.
193, 198 (2001)) (stating it is illegal for employers to unilaterally implement provi-
sions outside of collective bargaining agreement).
15. See id. at 524 (holding that it is illegal to unilaterally implement grooming
policy decisions outside of the collective bargaining agreement).
16. Lloyd Vance, Taking it to the House, http://lloydvance.wordpress.com/
(Mar. 28, 2008, 14:39 EST).
17. SeeYelnosky, supra note 11, at 523 (citing Pub. Serv. Co., 337 N.L.R.B. 193,
198 (2001)) (noting how employers often defend unilaterally implementing provi-
sions outside collective bargaining agreements). Conversely, unions have "success-
fully challenged employers' appearance codes on the grounds that the employer
had given up the right to implement the code under some other provisions of the
collective bargaining agreement," including the usual just cause provisions. Id. at
525.
18. Larry Coon, NBA Salary Cap FAQ July 11, 2007, http://members.cox.
net/lmcoon/salarycap.htm (explaining NBA CBA requires players uphold certain
dress requirements).
19. See Boys Mkts. v. Retail Clerks Union, 398 U.S. 235, 254 (1970) (holding
injunction is not prohibited when grievance subject to CBA, and employer is both
ready for arbitration and would suffer irreparable injury through violation of no-
strike obligation); see also NLRB v. Magnavox Co., 415 U.S. 322, 325-27 (1974)
(holding CBA authorization of employer to issue maintenance rules did not affect
union's waiver of right to distribute literature on premises).
2009]
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eliminate protections guaranteed under the Civil Rights Act. 20 The
Court elaborated that:
It is true, of course, that a union may waive certain statu-
tory rights related to collective activity, such as the right to
strike ..... These rights are conferred on employees col-
lectively. . . . Title VII, on the other hand, stands on
plainly different ground; it concerns not majoritarian
processes, but an individual's right to equal employment
opportunities.... In these circumstances, an employee's
rights under Title VII are not susceptible of prospective
waiver.21
Even the procedural rights to enforce substantive rights
granted under Title VII can be relinquished only by the individuals
possessing them, and not by any CBA.22 Furthermore, Title VII
rights are substantive rights guaranteed to and possessed by each
individual, and thus, cannot be waived by the individuals them-
selves, let alone by collective bargaining representatives. 23 In short,
individual employees, whether NBA superstars or low-wage labor-
ers, can agree to pursue Title VII rights exclusively through alterna-
tive dispute resolution ("ADR"), but neither the employee nor a
representative can abridge the actual substantive protections af-
forded under Title VII. 24
The implicit reference to the NBA Dress Code in players' indi-
vidual contracts and the CBA's "best interests of the game" provi-
sion do not substantively affect any dimensions of discrimination
that players face. 25 NBA players did not surrender their right to
challenge the NBA Dress Code under Title VII just because it was
implemented under the broad "best interests" provision of the
CBA.2 6 Moreover, they did not surrender those same Title VII sub-
20. See Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 59-60 (1974) (holding
that employee's right to trial de novo under Civil Rights Act is not prevented by
earlier submission of claim to final arbitration under CBA).
21. Id. at 51-52 (citing Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427 (1953)) (citations
omitted).
22. See id. at 48-49 (explaining procedural rights relating to Title VII may not
be waived in collective bargaining).
23. See id. at 52 (noting "mere resort to the arbitral form to enforce contrac-
tual rights" does not waive Title VII rights).
24. See id.
25. Coon, supra note 18 (referring to clauses in NBA CBA and players con-
tracts that identifies dress code); accord NBA Player Dress Code, supra note 2 (de-
tailing NBA Player Dress Code).
26. See Yelnosky, supra note 11, at 528 ("[L]abor law and the enforcement of
collective bargaining agreements generally give covered employees [about 13% of
[Vol. 16: p. I
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stantive rights by agreeing in their individual contracts to be neatly
and fully attired in public.27 At a minimum, players would be able
to initiate a claim of discrimination under the league's arbitration
process, or possibly even be required to use ADR by the NBA CBA,
in lieu of court.28 This paper now takes a closer look at the anti-
discrimination law that protects the irrevocable rights of individual
employees and limits commissioner and employer authority, with
or without the existence of a collective bargaining agreement.
III. EQUAL RIGHTS IN EMPLOYMENT AND ATHLETICS
Congress has used the public policy exception to empower
courts to prohibit workplace rules that discriminate against certain
protected classes since the Civil War. Discrimination, unfortu-
nately, has persisted in employment and athletics in the form of
"separate but equal" Jim Crow laws even after the Emancipation
Proclamation, the Civil War victory,29 the Fourteenth Amend-
ment,30 the Fifteenth Amendment 31 and the Civil Rights Acts of
1866 and 1871.32 Jim Crow laws governed most forms of athletic
competition, leading to the same segregation and harsh conditions
in sport that existed at work, schools, public facilities and neighbor-
hoods at that time.33 For instance, black colleges and conferences
surfaced in the South, yet were precluded from competing against
labor force] more protection from the imposition of appearance codes than any
other statutory or common law regulations.").
27. See generally id. (explaining union members cannot waive Title VII rights
through collective bargaining).
28. See Morrison v. Circuit City Stores, Inc., 317 F.3d 646, 658-59 (6th Cir.
2003) (distinguishing between enforceable and unenforceable arbitration
agreements).
29. See Maris A. Vinovskis, Have Social Historians Lost the Civil War: Some Prelimi-
nary Demographic Speculations, in TOWARD A SOCIAL HISTORY OF THE CIVIL WAR: Ex-
PLORATORY ESSAYS 1, 34 (Maris Vinovskis ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 2003) (noting
more Americans died in Civil War (620,000) than in any other war and almost as
many as all other wars combined).
30. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV (securing rights of former slaves). See generally
STEPHEN P. HALBROOK, FREEDMEN, THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT, AND THE RIGHT
TO BEAR ARMs 1866-1876 (1998) (noting that amendment was designed in part as
set of guidelines for "reconstruction" of Southern states, which required imple-
mentation to be readmitted to the Union).
31. U.S. CONST. amend. XV (prohibiting states from preventing citizens to
vote due to race, color or previous condition of servitude).
32. See 42 U.S.C. 21 § 1981 (2000) (giving citizens of all races (only men at
that time) same contractual rights, which included employment, to buttress Thir-
teenth Amendment's abolition of slavery); see also id. § 1983 (authorizing private
actions).
33. See Renford Reese, The Socio-Political Context of the Integration of Sport in
America, 4JouRNAL OF AFRICAN AMERICAN MEN 5, 7 (Spring 1999) (noting African-
Americans could not play organized professional baseball from 1890 to 1946).
2009]
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white schools. Even Northern teams, which permitted isolated in-
stances of black participation, succumbed to Southern segregation
by benching black players when they played segregated schools.
34
Jack Johnson held the heavyweight boxing championship from
1908-1915, after which African-Americans were prohibited from
challenging for the title until the 1930s.35
Fortunately, Jesse Owens and Joe Louis thwarted the Nazis'
claim of racial superiority in 1936 and 1938 respectively. Further-
more, in 1947, after a million blacks participated in and thousands
of others died in World War II, Jackie Robinson pioneered integra-
tion across the board by becoming the first black baseball player in
the all-white Major League. 36 The NFL and NBA followed suit in
1947 and 1951 respectively. The Supreme Court's decision in
Brown v. Topeka Board of Education ensured that integration would
move beyond sports into education and other areas of society.
37
The violence and delays, however, surrounding integration ef-
forts exemplified the resistance and reticence of many to change
their racist ways. Congress was compelled to act, passing the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, which outlawed discrimination in public facili-
ties and other areas like employment. 38 Even though sex, color,
national origin and religion were all included in its protected clas-
ses, it was the prohibition of race discrimination that was the pri-
mary purpose behind the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Four years after
the Civil Rights Act of 1964, sprinters Tommie Smith andJohn Car-
los made their own political proclamation for equality by raising
black-gloved fists high into the air on the Olympic victory stand in
Mexico City during the playing of the national anthem.
Unfortunately, prejudicial perspectives still linger as reflected
in the numbingly racist remarks about athletes and others made by
many media personalities.3 9 One radio announcer referred to the
34. See id. at 12 ("Many all-white teams, especially in the South, refused to play
against integrated teams.., the integrated teams usually gave in to the demands of
the all white-teams and withheld their black athletes from participating.").
35. See id. at 8-10 (describing Jack Johnson's controversial career).
36. See id. (noting Robinson was chosen in spite of more athletic players be-
cause of his character).
37. Brown v. Bd. of Educ. of Topeka, 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (holding that segre-
gation in public schools is unconstitutional).
38. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981-2000 (2000) (outlawing various discriminatory
practices).
39. See, e.g., Lewine Mair, Annika Sorenstam Battles to Make Cut in the Ricoh Wo-
men's British Open at Sunningdale, THE TELEGRAPH, Aug. 2, 2008, http://www.
telegraph.co.uk/sport/golf'/womensgolf/2487137/Annika-Sorenstam-battles-to-
make-cut-Golf.html (noting that golf announcer, Kelly Tilghman, was sus-
pended from Golf Channel after "joking" on air that Tiger Woods should be
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first African-American presidential candidate of a major political
party as a "magic negro," while another referred to the second best
women's collegiate basketball team as "nappy-headed hos. ''40 The
fall of 2004 hosted the infamous Pacers' brawl, while the following
months were dotted with player arrests for domestic violence, gun
possession, drug use, drunken driving and dog fighting.41 These
regrettable events tainted some of the athletic and economic suc-
cesses of minorities, but worse yet, renewed the stereotypical atti-
tudes of some towards African-Americans. Commissioners and
owners implemented a variety of policies to help repair their dam-
aged reputations - the establishment of grooming guidelines like
the NBA Dress Code being one small effort. These dress codes,
however, have given rise to a "second generation" of trait discrimi-
"lynched in a back alley"); Golfweek Fires Editor Responsible for 'Noose' Imagery,
ESPN.coM, Jan. 20, 2008, http://sports.espn.go.com/golf/news/story?id=320
2573 (describing Golweek magazine's subsequent story on Tilghman that featured
hangman's noose on magazine cover, leading it to fire its editor). See generally
Richard L. Harris, For Campanis, a Night that Lived in Infamy, LA TIMES, Aug. 5, 2008
at D2 (describing baseball's A] Campanis on Nightline in 1987 defending one ra-
cial remark about African-Americans lacking "some of the necessities to be . . . a
field manager, or perhaps a general manager" with an even more egregious anal-
ogy that "black men are not good swimmers... because they don't have the buoy-
ancy."); Jonathan Rowe, The Greek Chorus, WASHINGTON MONTHLY, Apr. 1988
(quotingJimmy "The Greek" Snyder shaming football by stating that black athletes
are bred to be better because, "[t] his goes all the way to the Civil War when ... the
slave owner would breed his big black to his big woman so that he would have a big
black kid.").
40. See Latching onto L.A. Times Op-Ed, Limbaugh Sings "Barack, The Magic Ne-
gro," MEDAMATrERS.ORG, Mar. 20, 2007, http://mediamatters.org/items/200703
200012 (Rush Limbaugh berated Barack Obama as "Barack the Magic Negro" and
then received contract renewal worth $35 million per year); see also CBS Fires Don
Imus from Radio Show, MSNBC.coM, Apr. 13, 2007, http://www.msnbc.msn.com/
id/18072804/ (noting that in 2007 radio personality Don Imus was fired for refer-
ring to Rutgers University's national championship runner-up women's basketball
team as "nappy-headed hos"); Roy Spencer, 20 Years of Rush Limbaugh, NATIONAL
REVIEW ONLINE, Aug. 1, 2008, http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2008/08/01/
opinion/main4313723.shtml (discussing Rush Limbaugh's long-running syndi-
cated radio program); Lynn Elber, Michael Richards, aka Kramer, Spews Racial Slurs
During Standup, S.F. CHRON., Nov. 20, 2006, (reporting that comedian Michael
Richards ranted racist epithets at black heckler); Students Rally After "Halloween in
the Hood" Party, NBC4.coM, Nov. 3, 2006, http://www.nbc4.com/news/10238567/
detail.html (reporting college students having party called "Halloween in the
Hood"); Columbia Professor: Noose Message "Very Personal," ABCNEWs.cOM, Oct. 11,
2007, http://abcnews.go.com/GMA/story?id=3716757&page=l (reporting about
noose placed on professor's office door). But see Marc Santora, Columbia Professor
in Noose Case is Fired on Plagiarism Charges, N.Y. TIMES, June 24, 2008, http://www.
nytimes.com/2008/06/24/nyregion/24columbia.html (reporting on firing of Co-
lumbia professor in noose case).
41. See Skip Wood, Titans'Jones Agrees to Plea Deal, USA TODAY, Nov. 14, 2007,
at C1 (noting Adam "Pacman" Jones was suspended for entire 2007 season after
being arrested over five times in three years, and that 2007 was same year Michael
Vick was convicted of organizing dog fighting ring and sent to federal prison).
2009]
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nation based on stereotypical notions of appearance, dress, traits
and characteristics. 42
For example, the courts have found that dress codes
(uniforms, jewelry, gender appropriate attire) and grooming guide-
lines (hairstyles, beards, tattoos, piercings) violate Title VII for their
unequal treatment of protected classes of race, sex and religion. 43
The NBA Dress Code, which seems wrought with racially discrimi-
natory overtones, serves as an intriguing example of trait discrimi-
nation. On the surface, the new "NBA Player Dress Code" arguably
appears to be a harmless effort to promote professionalism and de-
corum. It requires players to "wear Business Casual attire whenever
they are engaged in team or league business" and a sports coat,
dress shoes (or boots), and socks" when "in attendance at games
but not in uniform. '44 The requirement to dress professionally is
not the worst thing to happen to an employee's terms or conditions
of employment, even considering that the failure to comply may
result in significant fines and suspensions. But it is the "excluded
items" under the NBA's Dress Code that truly trigger concerns
about discrimination. Specifically, players are prohibited from
wearing "sneakers, sandals, flip-flops or work boots... chains, pen-
dants, or medallions... over [their] clothes," "sunglasses while in-
doors" and "headphones [presumably anywhere] (other than on
the team bus or plane, or in the team locker room).,,45 The items
mentioned have some stereotypical correlation with minority attire,
and therefore, the guidelines raise concerns about the coerced
compromise of one's racial identity as an adverse impact of the
dress code, and the possibility of a more deliberate discriminatory
demeanor on behalf of the league. Many NBA players rendered
their own judgment, calling the policy patently racist and hypocriti-
cal at best, though hypocrisy does not always equal illegality.46
42. See Sturm, supra note 3, at 460 (describing "second generation" discrimi-
nation claims as social practices and workplace interactions that gradually "exclude
nondominant groups"); Yuracko, supra note 3, at 366 (noting trait discrimination
is a new form of race discrimination).
43. See Fox, supra note 5, at 564 (discussing Title VII cases dealing with catego-
ries not traditionally seen as immutable).
44. NBA Player Dress Code, supra note 2 (stating NBA Player Dress Code).
45. Id.
46. See Associated Press, Pacers'Jackson: Dress Code is 'Racist, NBC Sports, Oct.
20, 2005, available at http://nbcsports.msnbc.com/id/9730334/site/21683474/
(describing Jackson's belief that NBA Dress Code is targeted at young, African-
American males).
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IV. AN INITIAL LOOK AT APPEARANCE RULES AND EMPLOYEES
UNDER TITLE VII
The Civil Rights Act of 1964 ("the Act") is the comprehensive
congressional legislation that prohibits discrimination in voting,
public facilities, public education, housing, credit and employ-
ment.47 Title VII of the Act was amended in 1991 and delineates
that it is unlawful for an employer "to discriminate against any indi-
vidual with respect to their compensation, terms, conditions or priv-
ileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color,
religion, sex or national origin."48 Over the years, the courts and
Congress interpreted Title VII to recognize three theories of em-
ployment discrimination: (1) disparate treatment; (2) mixed-mo-
tives; and, (3) disparate impact. The courts traditionally analyze
each theory under a tripartite framework established in McDonnell
Douglas, which includes: (1) plaintiffs prima facie case; (2) defen-
dant's affirmative defenses; and, (3) rebuttals by plaintiff to over-
come those defenses as nothing but a pretext.49 The three theories
share this framework, as well as their understanding of certain es-
sential elements (e.g., protected classes and adverse employment
actions). They differ distinctly, however, in their respective require-
ments for intent, defenses and remedies.
A. "Materially Adverse Impact" upon a "Protected Class" as to
"Terms or Conditions" of Employment
Generally, a violation of Title VII requires: (1) an adverse af-
fect to the terms or conditions of employment; (2) of individuals
within any of the statutorily protected classes; (3) done either inten-
tionally, unintentionally, or with mixed-motives; and, (4) with no
justifiable reason provided by an affirmative defense.50
47. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 1971-2000 (2000) (outlawing racial segregation in
schools, public places and employment).
48. Id. § 2000e-2(a)(1).
49. See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802-04 (1973) (dis-
cussing three step framework under which theories of employment discrimination
are analyzed); see also Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90, 94-98 (2003) (hold-
ing direct evidence of discrimination is not required in mixed motive case). The
proof of a pretext, however, no longer binds the jury or judge to an ultimate find-
ing of discrimination. See St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 511 (1993)
(finding plaintiff bears burden of persuasion even if there is presumed
discrimination).
50. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(2) (providing unlawful employment
practices).
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Title VII identifies both specific and general examples of unfa-
vorable treatment, such as "discharge,"51 "to otherwise discrimi-
nate" and to "adversely affect." 52 The courts understand
unfavorable treatment to require a "materially adverse employment
action" upon an employee's terms or conditions of employment,
but they do not necessarily restrict a materially adverse employment
action to Title VII's basic prohibitions.53 Both the courts and the
National Labor Relations Board have held that appearance codes
are "terms and conditions of employment" within the meaning of
Title VII and thus, subject to its prohibitions.54 To be "materially
adverse," however, the impact must be "more disruptive than a
mere inconvenience or an alteration of job responsibilities" 55 and
does not encompass minor subjective injuries.56
Title VII does not require employee appearance rules to be
identical, although the courts do expect some degree of equality
and consistency in the substance of the rules, their enforcement 57
and their consequences. 58 For instance, grooming guidelines that
call for different hairstyles or uniforms for men and women is not
an unlawful employment policy just because of the substantive dif-
ferences. 59 If, however, the expectations or application of the pol-
51. Id. § 2000e-2(a) (1) (making it unlawful to discharge employee for race
and other factors).
52. Id. § 2000e-2 (a) (2) (declaring it illegal "to limit, segregate or classify...
employees.., in any way which would.., adversely affect his status as an employee
53. See Herrnreiter v. Chicago Housing Auth., 315 F.3d 742, 746 (7th Cir.
2002) (discussing Title VII's retaliation provision).
54. See Yelnosky, supra note 11, at 523 n.15 (citing Crittenton Hospital, 342
N.L.R.B. No. 67 (2004) (stating uniform and fingernail policies regulating appear-
ance of nurses are mandatory subjects of bargaining)).
55. Galabya v. N.Y. City Bd. of Educ., 202 F.3d 636, 640 (2d Cir. 2000) (citing
Crady v. Liberty Nat'l Bank and Trust Co., 993 F.2d 132, 136 (7th Cir. 1993)).
56. See Forkio v. Powell, 306 F.3d 1127, 1131 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (discussing
party's insufficient allegations, though not appearance rules).
57. See Hollins v. Atlantic Co., Inc., 188 F.3d 652, 660-61 (6th Cir. 1999) (not-
ing grooming policy prohibiting ponytails was potentially applied in discriminatory
manner where only African-American worker was reprimanded and requested to
get style pre-approved).
58. See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 432 (1971) (holding that Con-
gress "directed the thrust of [Title VII] to the consequences of employment prac-
tices, not simply the motivation.").
59. See Willingham v. Macon Tel. Publ. Co., 507 F.2d 1084, 1088 (5th Cir.
1975) (holding grooming standards calling for substantive differences between
men and women were outside scope of Civil Rights Act, section 703).
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icy clearly result in a disparate impact, 60 unequal burdens61 or
imbalanced disciplinary action 62 upon a protected class, then the
guidelines are unlawful. 63
Disparate impact was the early theory for determining a mate-
rial adverse impact upon a protected class. The Supreme Court de-
termined that the disproportionate exclusion of a protected group
from certain jobs was an adverse effect worthy of Title VII protec-
tion, despite a lack of intent.64 The Jespersen court held that a re-
quirement to wear make-up did not discriminate against women,
reiterating that a sex-differentiated 65 policy is not proof in itself of
discriminatory intent or material adversity without a showing of un-
equal burdens upon one party.66 The majority of the court, how-
ever, made it clear that that the costs, time and hassles of putting on
make-up could be an unequal burden supporting discrimination.
67
60. See Griggs, 401 U.S. at 432 (discussing that policy is unlawful based on the
consequences (i.e., disparate impact, and not motivation behind policy)).
61. SeeJespersen v. Harrah's Operating Co., Inc., 444 F.3d 1104, 1110-11,
1113 (9th Cir. 2006) (en banc).
62. See Hollins v. Atlantic Co., Inc., 188 F.3d 652, 659-60 (6th Cir. 1999) (not-
ing employer disciplinary action does not require "precise equivalence" but should
be similar for conduct of "comparable seriousness.").
63. See 20 U.S.C §§ 1681-1688 (2000). Although known more for gender eq-
uity in intercollegiate athletics, Title IX of the 1972 Amendments to the Education
Act (1965) would also address the inconsistent application of sex-differentiated
appearance policies among educational institutions that receive Federal funding.
Id. Although modeled after the Civil Rights Act, Title IX does not use the McDon-
nell Douglas framework. Title IX developed its own "three-prong test," which mea-
sures statutory compliance by one of three tests: proportionality, expansion, or
interests. 34 C.F.R. §106.41 (2000); see also Policy Interpretation, 44 Fed. Reg. at
71,418 ("Compliance will be assessed in any one of the following ways . . ."); Mc-
Donnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802-04 (1973) (stating that "each
part of the three-part test is a safe harbor."); Cohen v. Brown Univ., 991 F.2d 888,
897 (1st Cir. 1996). Title IX usually approves dress codes for faculty, staff and
administrators that are relatively equal (but not identical) in content, application,
and burdens for both men and women.
64. See Griggs, 401 U.S. at 430-31 (1971) (requiring high school diploma in
1970's South affected African-Americans in greater numbers than whites because
educational opportunities had been limited many years).
65. See Smith v. City of Salem, Ohio, 378 F.3d 566, 573 (6th Cir. 2004) (noting
difference between "sex," which refers to individual's anatomical and biological
characteristics and "gender," which refers to socially-constructed norms associated
with a person's sex). Gender issues are generally excluded from the Act. Id. The
court said that "without more," the mere existence of different policies for men
and women (sex-differentiated) and for different sub-groups of women (intra-sex
distinctions) were not absolutely determinative of a Title VII violation. Id.
66. SeeJespersen, 444 F.3d at 1109 (noting sex-based difference in appearance
policy, without disparate effects, does not support discrimination case).
67. See id. at 1110 (holding that putting on make up is not unequal burden
because plaintiff presented insufficient evidence). But see Laffey v. Northwestern
Airlines, Inc. 366 F. Supp. 763 (D.D.C. 1973) (holding as discriminatory policy that
required women to wear contact lenses, while men could wear glasses).
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Presumably, the failure to equally reimburse similarly situated em-
ployees for costs related to company uniform purchases, dry-clean-
ing and the time it takes to dress may raise Title VII issues.
NBA players may utilize the disparate impact or unequal bur-
dens rationale to argue that their Dress Code is more burdensome
on black players who must adjust to a stereotypically white dress
code. African-American players may have to adjust their attire,
spending more time and money than their white colleagues. Al-
though the courts have acknowledged that the burdens or impact
of a dress code could become unequal or disparate enough to
reach the level of discrimination, the standard for it to be classified
as such is high.68 Therefore, even if the NBA Code imposed differ-
ent burdens upon blacks and whites, it would still be difficult to
prove discrimination. On the other hand, a disparity in the consis-
tency and amount of fines and penalties imposed upon players of
different races would qualify as a significant harm under the tradi-
tional Title VII framework. Furthermore, the NBA may expose it-
self to allegations of discrimination for unequal implementation of
the Dress Code by failing to enforce it among office personnel,
team owners or female employees - although these employees are
arguably not "similarly situated" as required under Title VII. 69
In the past, the NBA customarily limited its regulation of play-
ers' attire to games and the sidelines. The Dress Code, however,
broadens jurisdiction to times when players are outside the arena,
such as when they are approaching or departing a game via team
transportation. In fact, it applies whenever the players "are en-
gaged in team or league business. '70
B. Privacy
Privacy is a fundamental right in the home, but not in the
workplace. 71 Nonetheless, courts consider privacy rights when cal-
culating whether an appearance code is too intrusive by consider-
ing the expectation of privacy, the offensiveness of the invasion, the
68. SeeJespersen, 444 F.3d at 1110.
69. See Kampmier v. Emeritus Corp., 472 F.3d 930, 938 (7th Cir. 2007) (not-
ing that plaintiff failed to identify similarly situated individual who employer
treated differently, and therefore court properly granted summary judgment for
employer).
70. NBA Player Dress Code, supra note 2.
71. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 491-92 (1965) (holding contra-
ceptive ban unconstitutionally intruded on right to privacy).
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reason behind the policy and the existence and rejection of reason-
able alternatives .72
Professional sports leagues and their franchises, like other pri-
vate employers, are generally not subject to constitutional restric-
tions. Furthermore, while the NCAA also continues to avoid
constitutional critique for its regulatory rules,73 most universities
and colleges that comprise the organization are subject to the con-
stitutional amendments as a state actor.74 For example, the Seventh
Circuit recognized that a school board rule prohibiting basketball
players from having tattoos and colored hair could be challenged
under the Constitution.75 An earlier case found a high school
grooming code for athletes that required short hair unconstitu-
tional.76 The court did not find the promotion of teamwork, uni-
formity and discipline to be compelling enough reasons to justify
the denial of the fundamental rights to expression and liberty em-
bodied in personal appearance - especially hairstyle, which is his-
torically "shadowed with political, philosophical and ideological
overtones. ' "77 Conversely, one court held safety and health reasons
to be valid justifications for such dress codes, even prohibiting a
player from wearing a yarmulke during a game. 78 Another court
ruled that a "school district policy prohibiting students from wear-
ing clothing identifying any professional sports teams . . . violated
the First Amendment free speech rights of elementary and middle
school students."
79
Despite working for a private employer, NBA players should
receive the same protections given to grade-schoolers. Still, the ad-
verse affect upon the NBA players' privacy is not too severe since
72. See Catherine L. Fisk, Privacy, Power, and Humiliation at Work: Re-Examining
Appearance Regulation as an Invasion of Privacy, 66 LA. L. REv. 1111, 1127-30 (2006)
(listing courts' considerations of privacy rights).
73. See NCAA v. Tarkanian, 488 U.S. 179, 194-95 (1988) (deciding that NCAA
was not state actor when exercising its regulatory functions).
74. See id. at 191 (discussing further entanglements of state institutions).
75. See Stotts v. Cmty. Unit Sch. Dist., 230 F.3d 989 (7th Cir. 2000) (holding
high school freshman who challenged constitutionality of ban on tattoos would
have four years to litigate issue, however issue was moot where plaintiff had already
graduated). The case is not an exception to cases "capable of repetition, but evad-
ing review." Id. at 991.
76. See Dunham v. Pulsifer, 312 F. Supp. 411 (D.C. Vt. 1970) (holding groom-
ing code for athletes unconstitutional).
77. Id. at 419.
78. See Menora v. Illinois High Sch. Ass'n, 683 F.2d 1030 (7th Cir. 1982)
(prohibiting wearing yarmulkes fastened with bobby pins during play).
79. Max J. Madrid, Student Dress Codes: Constitutional Requirements and Policy
Suggestions, May 21, 1999, http://www.modrall.com/092
7 071190907578.art (citing
Jeglin v. San Jacinto Unified Sch. Dist., 827 F.Supp. 1459 (C.D. Cal. 1993)).
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their employment requires them to be in the public eye. If, how-
ever, the dress code is found to have racial motivations or impact it
might violate the proscriptions of Title II of the 1964 Civil Rights
Act by denying or conditioning use of public accommodations, like
a sports arena, upon a protected classification.8 0
C. Immutability as a Misguided Measure of Material Adversity8l
The courts, in both Title VII and Equal Protection cases,8 2 be-
gan using immutability8 3 as another measure of the "materially ad-
verse affect" upon a protected class.8 4 Therefore, dress codes that
proscribe hairstyles and jewelry usually will not violate Title VII be-
cause hairstyles are easily changed and jewelry is easily removed.8 5
This somewhat narrow and rigid application of the immutability re-
quirement is one of the primary imperfections of Title VII because
it fails to address the harms of assimilation and subordination that
result from trait discrimination.8 6
Assimilation and subordination are "material adverse" conse-
quences that employees may suffer when the trait in question is mu-
table and they are forced to change it.87 The Equal Employment
80. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000A(B) (3) (2000) ("Each of the following establishments
is a place of public accommodation within this title if its operations affect com-
merce, or if discrimination or segregation by it is supported by State action: any
motion picture house, theater, concert hall, sports arena, stadium or other place
of exhibition or entertainment ....").
81. See Mark R. Bandsuch, Dressing Up Title VII's Analysis of Workplace Apperance
Policies, 40.2 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REv. (forthcoming Oct. 2009).
82. See Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 690-91 (1973) (holding sex-
based classifications based to be inherently suspect and subjected to strict judicial
scrutiny).
83. See Garcia v. Gloor, 618 F.2d 264, 269 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 499 U.S.
1113 (1981) (defining immutability as the ease or difficulty of changing a trait or
characteristic).
84. See Roberto J. Gonzalez, Cultural Rights and the Immutability Requirement in
Disparate Impact Doctrine, 55 STAN. L. REv. 2195, 2217 (2003) (citing Garcia v. Spun
Steak Co., 998 F.2d 1480, 1486 (9th Cir. 1993)).
85. See Rogers v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 527 F. Supp 229, 232 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (us-
ing mutability of cornrow hairstyle to determine that employee was not "adversely
affected.").
86. See Gonzalez, supra note 85, at 2217-18 (noting that trait discrimination
does not cause "cognizable harm" under Rogers); see also Gowri Ramachandran,
Freedom of Dress: State and Private Regulation of Clothing, Hairstyle, Jewelry, Makeup,
Tattoos, and Piercing, 66 MD. L. REV. 11, 11 (2006) (proposing legal right to free
dress).
87. See Kenji Yoshino, Covering, 111 YALE L.J. 769, 879-925 (2002) (identifying
three methods of assimilating). Covering is downplaying an underlying and
known identity; passing is masking an underlying identity; and converting is chang-
ing an underlying identity as three methods of assimilating. Id.; see also Angela
Onwuachi-Willig, Volunteer Discrimination, 40 U.C. DAvis L. REv. 1895, 1898-1908
(2008). In a comparable theory of racial identity performance (called "volunteer
[Vol. 16: p. I
16
Jeffrey S. Moorad Sports Law Journal, Vol. 16, Iss. 1 [2009], Art. 1
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/mslj/vol16/iss1/1
NBA DREss CODE AND TITLE VII
Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") itself has honored this reason-
ing by holding that a company's no-Afro or bushy hair policy would
be a form of racial discrimination because it compromises a "cul-
tural symbol [for African-Americans] as to make its suppression...
an automatic badge of racial prejudice. '8 8 The harm caused by as-
similation can be emotional, economic, physical, professional, rela-
tional - and significant. 89 Furthermore, some of these harms reach
beyond the workplace and are contrary to the larger purpose and
goals of Title VII.
Instead of an all or nothing perspective of mutability, the
courts should consider the nature, degree, type, context, serious-
ness, pervasiveness and offensiveness of the group identity or per-
ception of the trait,90 and its compromise and related harms in a
manner similar to sexual and other harassment cases.91 For exam-
ple, the requirement to be clean-shaven is usually considered a mu-
table trait excluded from Title VII scrutiny, however, many clean-
shaven or no-beard policies raise questions of discrimination
against African-American men who suffer in disproportionate num-
bers from pseudofolliculitis barbae ("PFB"), severe shaving
bumps.92 Fortunately, most courts have ruled these policies to af-
fect a characteristic comparable to an immutable trait, 93 resulting
in a disparate impact upon black men, and thus, a violation of Title
VII.9 4 The same logic should hold for other types of identity harms
discrimination"), Onwuachi-Willig, identifies "accommodating" (adopting domi-
nant cultural norms as a means of advancement), "distancing" (distinguishing one-
self as a conforming outsider from nonconformists) and "resigned modeling"
(adopting norms in position as role model, even though do not accept them). Id.
at 1898.
88. E.E.O.C. Decision No. 71-2444, 4 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 18 (1971).
89. SeeYoshino, supra note 88, at 925 (describing different ways people assimi-
late); see also Paulette M. Caldwell, A Hair Piece: Perspectives on the Intersection of Race
and Gender, 1991 DuKE L.J. 365, 370-76 (1991) (discussing importance of hairstyle
to identity).
90. See Yuracko, supra note 3, at 410-13 (offering criteria courts should bal-
ance in evaluating immutability).
91. See Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 22-23 (1993) (holding no sin-
gle factor determinative in perceiving plaintiffs environment as hostile or abu-
sive). The Court held the proper inquiry was to evaluate and weigh all relevant
circumstances relating to the plaintiffs work environment. See id.
92. See Elizabeth M. Adamitis, Appearance Matters: A Proposal to Prohibit Appear-
ance Discrimination, 75 WASH. L. REv. 195, 203-05 (2000) (commenting on appear-
ance-discrimination claims involving PFB).
93. See Bradley v. Pizzaco of Neb., Inc., 7 F.3d 795, 799 (8th Cir. 1993) (hold-
ing individuals afflicted with PFB could not easily shave or comply with strict no-
beard policy); see also Adamitis, supra note 93, at 204-05 (discussing balancing test
court's use in appearance-related discrimination suits).
94. See Adamitis, supra note 93, at 203-05 (analyzing no-beard policies that
discriminate against individuals suffering from PFB). As in any disparate impact
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caused by assimilation and subordination since "being forced to
abandon a trait that is integral to one's sense of self may be person-
ally costly even if physically painless."95 Thus, Title VII should also
protect people from having to alter mutable traits that are just as
difficult and painful to change in terms of their racial, religious or
gender identity as PFB is to change physically.
D. Covering and Subordination under the NBA Dress Code
The "excluded items" under the NBA Dress Code immediately
elicited questions and concerns about racial bias, coerced covering,
and subordination. The Dress Code appears to target specific items
stereotypically associated with African-American culture, prohibit-
ing in particular throwback jerseys, headgear and an assortment of
jewelry. The NBA Dress Code seems to force players to compromise
or cover certain signals of their identification as black men. Such a
concession is a serious harm and adversely affects one's conditions
of employment 96 because attire and appearance are quite signifi-
cant to cultural, racial and personal identity and are historically
"shadowed with political, philosophical and ideological over-
tones. ' 97 Unfortunately, Tide VII analysis and its over reliance on
immutability undervalues this harm, erroneously concluding that it
has "at most a negligible effect on employment" because it involves
an "easily changed characteristic."98
The NBA Dress Code's description of acceptable "business cas-
ual" attire exacerbated the problem because it essentially detailed a
"white man's uniform" - khaki pants, collared dress shirt, and dress
shoes with socks. This prescriptive part of the NBA Dress Code
harms the players by forcing them to assimilate. 99 To restrict one's
cases, employers may still avoid judgments of discrimination if the policy is proven
to be job related, consistent with business necessity and no reasonable alternative
exists. See id. For example, even when impacting black men with PFB, the shaving
policy isjustified for firemen who need to wear respirators or supermarket employ-
ees who handle food. See Fitzpatrick v. City of Atlanta, 2 F.3d 1112, 1126-27 (11 th
Cir. 1993) (holding city's no-beard policy for firefighters was necessary for safety);
Woods v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 420 F. Supp. 35, 42 (E.D. Va. 1976) (holding no-
beard policy for supermarket employees who work with food was necessary to pro-
tect consumer's health).
95. Yuracko, supra note 3, at 376.
96. SeeYoshino, supra note 88, at 931-32 (commenting on negative effects of
assimilation).
97. Dunham v. Pulsifer, 312 F. Supp. 411, 419 (D. Vt. 1970).
98. Rogers v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 527 F. Supp 229, 231-32 (S.D.N.Y. 1981)
(quoting Garcia v. Gloor, 618 F.2d 264, 269 (5th Cir. 1980)).
99. See Yoshino, supra note 88, at 931-32 (detailing negative effects of
assimilation).
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ability to signal his or her association with a protected group iden-
tity is harmful, but then to further require employees to assimilate
an identity somewhat foreign and possibly hostile to their own is an
even more egregious and adverse injury.100 Thus, the immutability
requirement reinforces and sanctions this culture of coerced cover-
ing and assimilation 0 1 because the "courts fail to recognize that
'sometimes assimilation is not an escape from discrimination, but
precisely its effect.' "102
The compromise of one's identity inherent in assimilation per-
petuates two other racial harms: subordination and stigmatiza-
tion. 10 3 The NBA Dress Code tries to address negative stereotypes
society has associated with certain African-Americans and their at-
tire. Instead, by prohibiting chains, headgear and throwback jer-
seys, the NBA Dress Code stigmatizes those items and the people
that wear them. Furthermore, it reinforces the unfortunate associa-
tions with such styles, when it should be working, instead, to
broaden society's understanding and tolerance. This unseemly
combination of assimilation and stigmatization usually leads to the
perpetuation of an even uglier harm, subordination.10 4
A major criticism of the NBA Dress Code is that it is catering to
the desires of an elite group of Caucasian owners, merchandisers
and fans who disfavor certain aspects of the very NBA players that
they employ, promote and idolize. 10 5 Although owner and cus-
100. See id.
101. See Laura Morgan Roberts & Darryl D. Roberts, Testing the Limits of An-
tidiscrimination Law: The Business, Legal, and Ethical Ramifications of Cultural Profiling
at Work, 14 DuKEJ. GENDER L. & POL'Y 369, 387-89 (2007) (describing how identity
performance discrimination is strengthened by disparate-impact case law). Em-
ployers encourage assimilation and its harms in a variety of subtle manners, includ-
ing questions, comments, jokes and looks. See id. For example, both formal and
informal comments about an employee's wardrobe, hairstyle, choice in music, fa-
cial expressions, speaking voice, choice of vocabulary, intonation and accent, and
handshake style are just a few of the many ways employers send subtle and some-
times not-so-subtle messages that guide, pressure, and evaluate assimilation. See id.
Dress codes and appearance rules unfortunately make assimilation harms and
their underlying biases an accepted, formalized part of company culture. See id.
102. Ritu Mahajan, Comment, The Naked Truth: Appearance Discrimination, Em-
ployment and the Law, 14 AsuAN AM. L.J. 165, 181 (2007) (quoting Kenji Yoshino, The
Pressure to Cover, N.Y. TIMES MAGAZINE, Jan. 15, 2006, at 632). See generally Yoshino,
supra note 88 and accompanying text.
103. See Onwuachi-Willig, supra note 88, at 1913 (discussing stigmatization
through distancing, accommodating and resigned modeling).
104. SeeYuracko, supra note 3, at 367 (defining subordination as coerced sur-
render of identity and autonomy by protected group that is replaced with inferior
and dependent position in relation to majority).
105. See Michael A. McCann, The Reckless Pursuit of Dominion: A Situational
Analysis of the NBA and Diminishing Player Autonomy, 8 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 819,
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tomer preferences are valid considerations for justifying a business
policy, the justification is inadequate when the preferences are
rooted in prejudice and bias. 10 6 Dress codes are usually designed
and implemented by a white male workforce, are based on
predominantly white male community norms, accommodate white
male customer preferences, are enforced by a white male judicial
system, and approved by an act, Title VII, passed by a white male
legislature. Thus, the entire process perpetuates a cycle of stigmati-
zation, assimilation and subordination. 10 7 Title VII was enacted to
end this discriminatory dynamic, however, the immutability re-
quirement and other restrictions impede Title Vii's ability to do so.
An even uglier debate rages about whether professional sports, the
NBA in particular, are a great opportunity for black men or another
form of oppressive indentured servitude.
One redeeming quality of the NBA Dress Code is that players
may choose what type of business casual they will wear, thereby
maintaining some autonomy. NBA players retain a degree of con-
trol over their appearance and how they want to express them-
selves. The offensiveness of the code is further diminished because
it is technically part of the new CBA - implicitly agreed to by the
players. The harms of assimilation, stigmatization and subordina-
tion, albeit very real, are somewhat less severe than they would be if
the employees were subject to a broader ban, or worse, were re-
quired to adopt a specific attire or hairstyle that is not natural to
their group identity. Although the level of harm under the circum-
stances is reduced, there is still a significant "material adverse im-
pact" upon the NBA players' employment because of the combined
affect of assimilation, stigmatization and subordination.
827-32 (2006) (describing NBA's contradictory attempts to control and promote
its players).
106. See id. (presenting underlying policy considerations for NBA's dress
code).
107. See Yuracko, supra note 3, at 367 (discussing Richard T. Ford's position
that expanding Title VII may define groups and prevent their ability to change).
"[L]egally enshrining existing group-identified traits" (i.e., essentialism) may do
more harm by deepening the hierarchy, oppression, and social subordination re-
sulting from these traits. Id. at 385. These "essential traits" "may themselves be the
result of ... social subordination," creating an ugly cycle of discrimination and
subordination. Id. In short, drawing attention to the stereotype may in fact rein-
force the very biases the law wants to eradicate. See id. at 385-86 (commenting on
negative impact from defining legal scope of antidiscrimination). Assimilation is
often the easier path, but one that leads to the same undesirable destination of
social subordination and stigmatization. See generally Roberts & Roberts, supra note
102, and accompanying text on assimilation.
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The NBA's admirable actions are renowned and its shameful
behaviors are infamous due to the elevated position professional
sports occupy in society. Thus, the effects and adverse impact of
the NBA Dress Code increase through media coverage and player
pontifications. This is especially true when placed within the NBA's
recent history of player problems, referee scandals and other allega-
tions of racism.10 8 Lastly, when combined with society's current ra-
cial sensitivities surrounding a black presidential candidate and the
resurfacing of racist rhetoric, the NBA Dress Code appears quite
harmful, impacting larger society and reinforcing negative stereo-
types directed against people of color.
E. The Immutability Requirement as Determinative of Protected
Class Status1 0 9
Appearance codes or grooming policies that discriminate "be-
cause of' or "on the basis of' the protected categories, "race, color,
religion, sex or national origin," violate Title VII.'1 0 Membership in
the protected class is a prerequisite to statutory protection because
Title VII was designed purposely to protect those groups historically
denied equal employment opportunities because of prejudicial
treatment. Unfortunately, the courts have also read an immutabil-
ity requirement into the determination of protected class status,
which has rendered Title VII protection inconsistent.1 1 '
1. Trait Discrimination Based on Race, Color or National Origin
More recent policies like the NBA Dress Code seem to target
African-American appearance through prohibitions on dreadlocks,
108. See NBA Local: August 16 - Donaghy Edition, ESPN.coM, Aug. 16, 2007,
http://sports.espn.go.com/nba/news/story?page=nbalocal/07081 6/donaghy (re-
porting on NBA's referee scandal); Players, NBA Dismiss Racial Bias in Officiating,
ESPN.coM, May 4, 2007, http://sports.espn.go.com/nba/news/story?id=2858453
(describing allegations of racial bias in NBA's officiating); Pacers Center Thinks NBA
Age Limit has Racist Undertones, ESPN.coM, Apr. 12, 2005, http://sports.espn.go.
com/espn/wire?section=nba&id=2035221 (alleging NBA's age limit is driven by ra-
cist motives).
109. See generally Bandsuch, supra note 82 (covering topic of employee
discrimination).
110. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1)-(2) (2000); see also William R. Corbett, The
Ugly Truth About Appearance Discrimination and the Beauty of Our Employment Discrimi-
nation Law, 14 DUKEJ. GENDER L. & POL'v 153, 164 n.69 (2007) (noting seventeen
states and District of Columbia have laws prohibiting discrimination on basis of
sexual orientation).
111. See Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 63 (2006)
(holding retaliation provision contains materiality requirement and objective stan-
dard); see also Gonzalez, supra note 85, at 2217 (advocating for elimination of im-
mutability requirement).
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tattoos, braided hair or visible jewelry. Policies involving mutable
traits such as these, however, are generally upheld because when a
policy is directed toward a mutable trait courts do not consider it to
involve a protected class or to cause any substantial harm. The
EEOC recognized the flaw in this approach and acknowledged the
possibility that a trait could be "so appropriated as a cultural symbol
by members of the Negro race" as to satisfy the protected class crite-
ria under Title VII. 112 Another court acknowledged the possible
application of this theory to "African styled" clothing, but held the
plaintiff-employee failed to provide enough evidence that the fash-
ion or hairstyle at issue was so closely affiliated with race or national
origin as to deserve comparable protection. 11 3 Similar scrutiny was
given to policies that targeted cultural traits related to national ori-
gin "in favor of [a] Native American who was fired for refusing to
cut his long hair"' 1 4 and a "height requirement for sheriffs.., was
racially discriminatory against Mexican-Americans.'
1
2. Trait Discrimination Based on Sex
The term "sex" in Title VII was originally understood narrowly
to mean the biological dimension of the person, denying protec-
tion to gender as a social construct. 16 The Price Waterhouse Court
changed the restricted view of "sex" as strictly biological, expanding
the reading of Title VII to prohibit discrimination rooted in gender
112. E.E.O.C. Decision No. 71-2444, 4 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 18, 1
(1971).
113. See McManus v. MCI Commc'n Corp., 748 A.2d 949, 952, 954-55 (D.C.
Cir. 2000).
As to her claim of racial discrimination, appellant contends that she be-
longs to a protected class, that she was qualified for the job she held, that
she was fired nonetheless, that her position itself never had been elimi-
nated, and that a person of a different race had filled it. If this were true,
all elements of a prima facie case, including the "substantial factor" re-
quirement of the fourth criterion, would have been satisfied.
Id. at 954-55.
114. Dodd v. SEPTA, No. 06-4213, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 46878, at *16 (E.D.
Pa. June 26, 2007) (citing Adakai v. Front Row Seat, No. 96-2249, 1997 U.S. App.
LEXIS 27014 (10th Cir. Oct. 1, 1997) (unpublished opinion)); see generally EEOC
Definition of National Origin Discrimination, 29 C.F.R. § 1606.1 (2000) (requiring
national origin discrimination to be examined under principals of disparate treat-
ment and adverse impact).
115. Lynn T. Vo, A More Attractive Look at Physical-Based Discrimination: Filling
the Gap in Appearance-Based Anti Discrimination Law, 26 S. ILL. U.L.J. 339, 348 (2002)
(citing Craig v. County of Los Angeles, 626 F.2d 659, 668 (9th Cir. 1980)).
116. See Smith v. City of Salem, Ohio, 378 F.3d 566, 573 (6th Cir. 2004) (ap-
plying narrow definition of sex). In a Title VII context, sex "refer[s] to an individ-
ual's anatomical and biological characteristics" and gender "refer[s] to socially-
constructed norms associated with a person's sex." Id.
[Vol. 16: p. I
22
Jeffrey S. Moorad Sports Law Journal, Vol. 16, Iss. 1 [2009], Art. 1
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/mslj/vol16/iss1/1
NBA DREss CODE AND TITLE VII
stereotypes associated with the protected class of sex and used "with
equal force to discrimination based on race, religion, or national
origin." 117 The Court found that the female plaintiff was wrongly
denied partnership in her accounting firm based in part on "stere-
otypical notions about women's proper deportment."' 1 8 The
$300,000 question that remains is what degree of stereotyping
equates to protected class status, is harmful to the individual and
may even imply intent to discriminate.1 19  Even after Price
Waterhouse, however, the traditional rule that sex-differentiated ap-
pearance policies are not inherently discriminatory remains.' 20
3. Trait Discrimination Based on Religion: Reasonable Accommodations
for Hair, Tattoos, Piercings and Body Art 12 1
Religion is also a protected class under Title VII, which pre-
cludes employers from discriminating based on any and "all aspects
of religious observance and practice, as well as belief."1 22 Many reli-
gions require observers to maintain a certain appearance. Muslim
men must grow facial hair; Jewish men must wear a yarmulke; and
some Christian women must wear medals. Appearance codes re-
quiring workers to be clean-shaven and to refrain from wearing
headwear and jewelry have religious implications upon the above
groups and invoke the scrutiny of Title VII.
Employers must reasonably accommodate employees as to "all
aspects of religious observance and practice" unless such accommo-
dation creates an "undue hardship on the conduct of the em-
ployer's business."' 23 For example, a hospital reasonably
accommodated employees' religious beliefs when it allowed "Mus-
117. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 244 n.9 (1989).
118. Id. at 256.
119. See 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b) (3) (D) (2000) (stating damages cap under Title
VII is $300,000).
120. SeeJespersen v. Harrah's Operating Co., Inc., 444 F.3d 1104, 1113 (9th
Cir. 2006) (en banc) (holding sex-based appearance polices are not inherently
discriminatory, but not precluding "sex-stereotyping on the basis of dress or ap-
pearance codes").
121. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e) (2) (granting religious organizations limited
exemption - especially educational institutions "directed toward the propagation
of the faith").
122. Id. § 2000e(j). The Court has decided that section 1982 also covers peo-
ple of the Jewish religion and of Arab origin because they were both classified as
distinct races at the time the act was promulgated. See Shaare Tefila Congregation
v. Cobb, 481 U.S. 615, 617-18 (1987) (holdingJews and Arabs in protect class); see
also Saint Francis Coll. v. A1-Khazraji, 481 U.S. 604, 613 (1987) (holding individuals
of Arabian descent protected under section 1982).
123. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j).
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lim women to wear skirts instead of uniform pants.' 24 In sports,
the NBA reasonably accommodated Mahmoud Abdul-Raufs Is-
lamic practices by allowing him to pray to himself while standing
for the national anthem - only after suspending him first.125 On
the other hand, accommodations that create an undue hardship for
the business are unreasonable and not required under Title VII.
126
Tattoos, piercings and body art raise religious discrimination
issues in the private sector apart from the expression questions they
create in the public sector.127 Although tattoos are an immutable
trait in one sense, the general ease in which they may be covered,
or even removed, renders them relatively mutable in the eyes of the
court, who often afford them less protection under Title VII. 128 In
a contrary example, Red Robin Gourmet Burgers recently settled a
suit brought by the EEOC on behalf of a worker terminated for
refusing to cover up tattoos received as part of a ceremony in his
Kemetic religion. 129 Due to the religious significance of the tattoos
and that the employee was a cook with very limited customer inter-
action, covering them up was not considered a reasonable accom-
modation or business necessity by the EEOC. 130
124. Barbara L. Jones, Keeping Up Appearances: How to Advise Your Employer Cli-
ents on Addressing Issues of Dress, ST. Louis DAILY RECORD & ST. Louis COUNTIAN,
Aug. 20, 2005 (discussing legal developments concerning Dress Codes).
125. See Jason Diamos, Abdul-Rauf is Calm in Face of Controversy, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 21, 1996, at CI (covering Mahmoud Abdul-Rauf's religious practices).
126. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j) (presenting limitations of Title VII).
127. See Mark McGraw, Limiting Looks, HuMAN RESOURCE EXECUTIVE ONLINE,
Oct. 2, 2005, http://www.hreonline.com/HRE/story.jsp?storyld=4269043 (discuss-
ing legal issues surrounding employees' appearances). Rules against tattoos and
piercings are not isolated concerns because approximately half of employees wear
them, raising concerns about unintended discrimination and the retention of
quality employees. See id.
128. See Stephenson v. Davenport Cmty. Sch. Dist., 110 F.3d 1303, 1308-09
(8th Cir. 1997) (noting school district required her to remove tattoo); see also Lu-
cille M. Ponte &Jennifer L. Gillian, Gender Performance Over Job Performance: Body Art
Work Rules and the Continuing Subordination of the Feminine, 14 DuKEJ. GENDER L. &
POL'v 319, 333 (2007) (discussing mutability issues).
129. See EEOC v. RED ROBIN GOURMET BURGERS, INC., No. C04-1291 JLR, 2005
WL 2090677, at *1 (W.D. Wash. Sept. 7, 2005); see also Fox, supra note 5, at 565
(discussing Red Robin's case).
130. See RED ROBIN, 2005 WL 2090677, at *4-5; see also Fox, supra note 5, at 565
(discussing Red Robin's case). But see Swartzentruber v. Gunite Corp., 99 F. Supp.
2d 976, 980-81 (N.D. Ind. 2000) (allowing KKK tattoos to be covered up to avoid
hostile workplace); Dixon v. Coburg Dairy, Inc., 330 F.3d 250, 263-64 (4th Cir.
2003) (upholding company's firing of employee who failed to remove confederate
flag stickers from tool box).
[Vol. 16: p. I
24
Jeffrey S. Moorad Sports Law Journal, Vol. 16, Iss. 1 [2009], Art. 1
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/mslj/vol16/iss1/1
NBA DREss CODE AND TITLE VII
4. Trait Discrimination Based on Disability
The Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 ("ADA")1 3 ' adds
disability to the protected classes given equal employment opportu-
nity protection. 132 The ADA prohibits employers from discriminat-
ing against people based on their physical limitations and medical
conditions, which includes allergies and HIV/AIDS among
others. 1 33
5. Trait Discrimination Based on Age Before Beauty
Businesses that pursue youthful looking employees may be vio-
lating the prohibitions of the Age Discrimination in Employment
Act of 1975 ("ADEA"), which precludes unfair treatment on the ba-
sis of age with regard to employment.1 3 4 An employer's characteri-
zation of "beauty" may also invoke issues of other forms of
discrimination, including race. Clothing retailer Abercrombie &
Fitch settled a lawsuit related to its policy of hiring young, white
males as "brand representatives," while keeping workers of different
races and colors off the sales-floor and in the stockroom.13 5
6. Trait Discrimination Based on More than One Protected Class
Multi-group consequences or "intersectionality" are an inter-
esting consideration for the courts when calculating the degree and
breadth of the trait's impact on the protected class under both dis-
parate treatment and disparate impact. 136 Certain groups possess
combined identities or sub-classifications as well as inter-group or
131. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (2000) (providing national mandate to pre-
vent discrimination against disabled people).
132. Id. § 12102 (2) (A) (defines disability as "a physical or mental impairment
that substantially limits one or more . . . major life activities" like walking, seeing,
eating, and hearing).
133. See Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624 (1998) (protecting asymptomatic
HIV positive patient under ADA); see also 29 C.F.R. § 1630.16(e) (2001) (stating
employers under the ADA must attempt to accommodate food handling employ-
ees, who have infectious or communicable diseases); Fox, supra note 5, at 564
(referencing Erin Weber v, Infinity Broad. Corp., No. 02-74602, 2005 WL 3726303
(E.D. Mich. May 23, 2005) (discussing that perfume allergies are protected under
ADA)).
134. 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1967) (promoting employment because of ability,
not age).
135. Paula Burke Erickson, More People Benefiting From Discrimination Laws, THE
DAILY OKOAHOMAN, May 1, 2005, at 1.
136. See Roberts & Roberts, supra note 102, at 392-93 ("Intersectionality is the
notion that particular social groups are constituted by multiple status identities
and the different status holders within a group encounter different forms of
discrimination.").
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intra-group status.' 13 7 When this occurs, a plaintiff may have com-
bined claims, for example, a disability claim with a sex-differenti-
ated dress code discrimination claim. 138 Furthermore, a "no corn-
row" policy can impact an employee as both an African-American
and a woman. The courts have affirmed this position to some de-
gree by acknowledging "black women" as a distinct protected group
under Title VII. 1 3 9
The Equal Protection Clause has an affinity with Title VII be-
cause it is based on a similar concept, protecting certain classes of
people. For example, race, nationality and citizenship are suspect
classes that receive strict scrutiny and are given greater deference
than gender and age, which are quasi-suspect classes that receive
intermediate scrutiny.140 All other classes receive very little protec-
tion under rational basis review. 141
7. Congress and the Courts did not Intend Immutability to be the
Primary Measure for Title VIP42
Congress and the Supreme Court never intended, nor held,
nor actually used immutability as the sole criteria for the determina-
tion of suspect class status. 43 The courts first began to use the con-
cept of immutability in Equal Protection cases to help them
determine whether a group deserved suspect class status and the
corresponding anti-discrimination protection.144 Instead of relying
solely on immutability, the courts and Congress purposefully based
suspect class status on the representative group's political
powerlessness, history of discrimination, irrelevance of a trait to
137. See id. at 393 (noting various identities that comprise individuals).
138. See Jennifer L. Levi, The Interplay Between Disability and Sexuality: Clothes
Don't Make the Man (or Woman), but Gender Identity Might, 15 COLUM. J. GENDER & L.
90, 92-93 (2006) (discussing Collective Hunch Theory and transgender litigants
challenging sex-differentiated dress codes).
139. SeeJefferies v. Harris County Cmty. Action Ass'n, 615 F.2d 1025, 1034
(5th Cir. 1980) (noting employers "may not single out black women for discrimina-
tory treatment").
140. See United States v. Carolene Products, 304 U.S. 144, 153 n.4 (1938)
(comparing levels of scrutiny); see also Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11 (1967)
(subjecting racial classifications to strict scrutiny); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190,
197-98 (1976) (analyzing gender-based classifications).
141. See Carolene Products, 304 U.S. at 153 n.4 (comparing levels of scrutiny).
142. See generally Bandsuch, supra note 82 (covering topic of employee
discrimination).
143. See Watkins v. U.S. Army, 875 F.2d 699, 725 (9th Cir. 1989) (immutable
characteristics are not necessary for Title VII case).
144. See San Antonio Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 28-29 (1973) (hold-
ing school finance system does not discriminate against definable suspect class of
poor people).
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one's employment and overall sense of injustice - in combination
with immutability.145 Names, accents, age, alien status, language,
religion, mannerisms, some disabilities and even sex are all mutable
characteristics that have been recognized as possible forms of
discrimination.146
In Griggs v. Duke Power, a high school diploma, a clearly muta-
ble trait, was the source of the disparate impact upon unschooled
minority employees.' 47 If the current courts applied Griggs to dress
codes, then a prima facie case of disparate impact would exist be-
cause a seemingly neutral grooming policy would clearly have a
more detrimental impact upon one protected group over another,
regardless of the mutability of the criteria. Unfortunately, the
courts seem to circumvent disparate impact analysis by reasoning
that the mutability of the trait renders the consequences not mate-
rial or adverse enough to require legal redress. They further rea-
son that the association of an educational trait to a protected class is
too tenuous to necessitate coverage. 148 This judicial reasoning is
clearly in error, since mutability does not necessarily render the
changing of a trait less adverse, less material or less relevant.
8. A Suggested Hierarchy of Protected Classes149
The courts, when determining the level of protection to afford
a class of people under either Title VII or the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, should give significant weight to the importance of the
group's interest, the history of their unequal treatment and their
145. See Ken Nakasu Davison, Note and Comment, The Mixed-Race Experience:
Treatment of Racially Miscategorized Individuals Under Title VII, 12 ASIAN L.J. 161, 167
(2005) ("Congress has adopted an expansive definition of discrimination.").
146. See generally Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971) (denying welfare
benefits based on alien status is unconstitutional); see also City of Cleburne v.
Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 441 (1985) (indicating that immutability ap-
pears to be description for characteristics "beyond the individuals' control").
Even if immutability were a prerequisite for finding discrimination, it still seems
inaccurate to view immutability in so narrow and rigid a manner (i.e., the absolute
inability to change the characteristic in question) or to reduce it to a biological
basis. See id.
147. See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 436 (1971) (holding testing
measures must reasonably measure job performance before being given control-
ling force).
148. See Gonzalez, supra note 85, at 2216 (challenging connection require-
ment); see also Ramachandran, supra note 87, at 21 (questioning antidiscrimination
law's focus on "immutable" traits and its lack of protection for "performative as-
pects of identity.").
149. See generally Bandsuch, supra note 82 (covering topic of employee
discrimination).
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political powerlessness. 150 Accordingly, discrimination based on
race is especially abhorred and strictly scrutinized. Rather, the
harm to the protected group is given greater weight and considera-
tion than it might be given if suffered by other classes under similar
circumstances. 15 1
The Supreme Court has read the Equal Protection Clause 152 to
afford greater protections to the suspect classes of race, nationality,
citizenship and religion 153 than to the quasi suspect classes of sex,
age, legitimacy and disability.'54 Although other minority groups
and classes were given protection under Title VII, the equal oppor-
tunities for people of all races were the driving force behind the
Act.155 Congress essentially codified this point by purposely omit-
ting race, and only race, from the bona fide occupational qualifica-
tion ("BFOQ") defense and by continuing to permit race, under
the 1866 Civil Rights Act, to be the only protected class entitled to
compensatory damages in cases without intentional discrimina-
tion.1 56 The courts have done their best to follow the statute's in-
tent by closely examining any policy with racial implications. The
paradigmatic example was Griggs, where the Supreme Court cre-
ated the disparate impact doctrine to protect against race discrimi-
nation that lacked the requisite intent.157 Meanwhile, scholars like
Corbett have ranked the strength of federal employment anti-dis-
150. See Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. at 472 (Marshall, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part) (noting "[n]o single talisman" can define discriminated
groups and political powerlessness is relevant but neither necessary nor sufficient
to determine appropriate level of protection).
151. See id. at 440 (plurality opinion) (stating that statutes classifying people
by "race, alienage, or national origin" are subject to strict scrutiny).
152. See Smith v. City of Salem, Ohio, 378 F.3d 566, 577 (6th Cir. 2004) ("To
prove a violation of the equal protection under § 1983, [a plaintiff] must prove the
same elements as are required to establish a disparate treatment claim under Title
VII." (quoting Lautermilch v. Findlay City Schs., 314 F.3d 271, 275 (6th Cir.
2003)).
153. See Shaare Tefila Congregation v. Cobb, 481 U.S. 615, 617-18 (1987)
(holding Jewish congregation can bring claim against Caucasian defendants for
violation of federal civil rights statute prohibiting racially discriminatory interfer-
ence with property rights); see also Saint Francis Coll. v. AI-Khazraji, 481 U.S. 604,
610 (1987) (holding Arabian heritage protected from racial discrimination).
154. See Corbett, supra note 111, at 168 (ranking disability as less legally pro-
tected characteristic than race, sex, age and religion).
155. See id. at 165 (noting Congress' "grandest vision" for Title VII was to
eradicate race and sex discrimination).
156. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e) (1) (2000) (prohibiting discriminatory em-
ployment practices).
157. See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 436 (1971) (holding policy
requiring workers to have high school diploma illegal). While the policy appeared
to be neutral, it had the adverse affect of disqualifying more black job applicants
than white due to educational inequalities. See id.
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crimination law by calculating the protections afforded each respec-
tively in descending order to be: (1) race or national origin; (2)
sex; (3) age; (4) religion; and, (5) disability. 158
The courts should also look carefully at the group's history of
discrimination in general, of discrimination in the respective indus-
try, the discrimination record with a particular employer and the
group's current political powerlessness. Even though there is much
to elevate gender to the protected status that race has, Title VII
should provide more protection to traits associated with race since
the history of discrimination against people of color has been espe-
cially abhorrent in this country. 159 Race was given especially privi-
leged and protected status under Title VII 160 and race continues to
be a source of great prejudice and impediment in the workplace.
The courts should also take into consideration the number of em-
ployees impacted within the protected class without applying the
four-fifths rule formally.
Thus, the NBA Dress Code in many ways contravenes the goals
and objectives of Title VII. The NBA Dress Code adversely impacts
African-Americans, which renders it quite harmful considering the
history of black oppression inside and outside the workplace and
because the concept of racial equality served as the impetus for Ti-
tle VII. The fact that the NBA policy could possibly impact religion
and national origin as well makes it even more serious. Approxi-
mately 80% of the 450 signed players are African-American, which
means that the approximate number of individuals impacted is
360.161 This again testifies to the breadth of its potential harms.
These injuries are also inflicted on the larger population through
the popularity of the NBA and the breadth of its reach through the
media. For an example of the NBA's popularity, at least one-hun-
dred million people watched Team USA, which is comprised of
NBA players, defeat China in an August 2008 Olympic basketball
158. See Corbett, supra note 111, at 168 (ranking level of federal protection
for covered characteristics).
159. See, e.g., Jefferies v. Harris County Cmty. Action Ass'n, 615 F.2d 1025,
1033-34 (5th Cir. 1980) (acknowledging black women as distinct protected group
under Title VII).
160. See Yuracko, supra note 3, at 365-66 (describing Title VII's success at end-
ing blatant race discrimination).
161. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) ("[A]n unlawful employment practice ... to
discriminate against any individual .. .because of such individual's race, color
.). More weight is given when so many employees are impacted, but Title VII
clearly protects the rights of individuals within the protected class - not just the
class itself. See id.
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game. 162 Thus, the NBA Dress Code and other appearance policies
that impact race should be scrutinized more closely and considered
to inflict more serious harm upon its protected class than is pres-
ently recognized under Title VII.
V. A CLOSER LOOK AT EMPLOYER'S AND THEIR
APPEARANCE RULES
1 6 3
Title VII, as first conceived, written and interpreted, focused
on the employer's intention to discriminate as an essential element
of an unlawful employment action. The concept and requirements
of intentionality have evolved so that now the courts consider how
much of a factor the protected class status plays in the employer's
harmful policy or action.' 64 This in turn determines the appropri-
ate theory of discrimination under Title VII and the available de-
fenses and respective remedies.' 65 There are different standards
for establishing the employer's improper intent in a prima facie
case of discrimination under Title VII's various theories. 166
A. Employer's Intentionality
First, single-intent cases require direct evidence' 67 that the pro-
tected class status was a substantial (or determinative) factor in the
employer's unfavorable employment decisions. 16s The courts have
clarified that the ill-will of animus is not necessary for intentional
discrimination. 169 For example, the sexist correspondence between
162. See Carl Bialik, About That Basketball Audience of a Billion, WALL ST. J. ON-
LINE, Aug. 12, 2008, http://blogs.wsj.com/numbersguy/about-that-basketball-
audience-of-a-billion-393/ (describing Olympic basketball game and explaining
audience estimates).
163. See Bandsuch, supra note 90 (forthcoming Oct. 2009).
164. See id.
165. See id.
166. See Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 291-92 (1989) (dissenting
opinion) (arguing various approaches to discrimination will cause confusion
among courts). The dissent argued the lack of uniformity would result in an un-
clear understanding of what qualifies as direct or circumstantial evidence or the
relative meanings of substantial factor, motivating factor and determinative factor.
See id.; see also Martin J. Katz, The Fundamental Incoherence of Title VII: Making Sense of
Causation in Disparate Treatment Law, 94 GEO. LJ. 489, 491 (2006) (examining vari-
ous standards).
167. See EEOC v. Liberal R-II Sch. Dist., 314 F.3d 920, 923 (8th Cir. 2002)
(explaining direct evidence includes remarks, comments and other communica-
tions reflecting discriminatory attitude).
168. See Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 276 (O'Connor, J. concurring) (detailing
"substantial factor" theory); see also Katz, supra note 165, at 502 (outlining "deter-
minative factor" theory).
169. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1) (2000) (prohibiting discriminatory em-
ployment practices); see also Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 987
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voting partners regarding the plaintiff in Price Waterhouse provided
enough direct evidence to conclude that her sex was a substantial
factor in the rejection of her partnership application and thus was a
form of intentional discrimination under Title VII.1
70
Second, mixed-motive cases require sufficient evidence that
the protected class status was a motivating factor in the less
favorable treatment.1 7 1 The courts have interpreted the 1991
Amendment's qualifying phrase of "even though other factors also
motivated the practice" to mean that any consideration at all of pro-
tected class status (however slight) by the employer in the unfavora-
ble decision is an improper motivating factor. 172 This satisfies the
element of intent necessary for a prima facie case of mixed-motive
discrimination under Title VII.
1 7 3
Third, disparate impact cases do not require any proof of in-
tent to discriminate on behalf of the employer. Additionally, they
do not require proof that the protected class status was any type of
factor in the employer's questionable decision. The plaintiff-em-
ployee only needs to demonstrate that the questionable "employ-
ment practice . . . causes a disparate impact on the basis of race,
[or] color .... - 174 Causation in this context does not mean intent
or motive, but rather some nexus between the employer's policy,
action or decision and the materially adverse impact upon the
employees. 175
Fourth, retaliation cases require sufficient evidence (direct or
circumstantial) that retaliation was a determinative factor in the less
favorable treatment. 176 Title VII prohibits discrimination against
(1988) (" [S] ome employment practices, adopted without a deliberately discrimina-
tory motive, may in operation be functionally equivalent to intentional
discrimination.").
170. Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 235-36, 258 (majority opinion) (describing
sexist criticisms of plaintiffs personality).
171. See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 807 (1973) (estab-
lishing burden of proof); see also Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90, 101-02
(2003) (providing burden of proof in mix-motive cases).
172. Desert Palace, Inc., 539 U.S. at 101 (holding under Title VII plaintiff does
not have to provide direct evidence of discrimination for mixed motive jury
instruction).
173. See Katz, supra note 165, at 491 (discussing mixed-motive cases).
174. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k) (1) (A) (i) (2000).
175. See Katz, supra note 165, at 504 (arguing Congress probably intended
"minimal causation").
176. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (prohibiting discriminatory employment prac-
tices). Specifically, the statute provides:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to discrimi-
nate against any of his employees . . . because he has opposed any prac-
tice made an unlawful employment practice by this subchapter, or
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employees because they have "opposed... made a charge, testified,
assisted, or participated in any manner in an investigation, proceed-
ing, or hearing" in regards to any practice reasonably believed to be
an unlawful employment practice.' 77
1. Title VII Fails to Adequately Consider Cognitive Bias and Stereotypes
Title VII's current categories of single-intent (substantial fac-
tor) and mixed-motive (motivating factor) do not adequately assess
the complexities of cognitive bias. Cognitive bias describes how the
employer - knowingly or unknowingly, consciously or uncon-
sciously, rationally or irrationally - connects the visible signals of
the person's outward appearance, not with actual work abilities, but
rather with stereotypical or prejudicial perspectives about a certain
race, religion or gender. For example, employers may relate
grooming, hairstyle, jewelry, glasses and attire with characteristics
like intelligence, honesty, loyalty and discipline. 178 Facial features,
height and weight also carry certain connotations about personality
and performance, as do behavioral traits like language, accents and
smoking.179 Employers use these traits as signals to assess the abili-
ties and attitudes of individuals and their compatibility with the or-
ganization and its values.180
Professional sports leagues are arguably the worst offender of
cognitive bias and proxies since physical features like height, weight
and muscle tone are primary considerations when making employ-
ment decisions. For example, the NFL subjects potential draft
choices to rigorous testing and body measurement.' 8 ' Of course,
the NFL and other sports leagues escape any potential liability be-
cause most of the physical characteristics are arguably a true proxy
and a business necessity for meeting the job requirements of a pro-
fessional athlete. But what about the dearth of minorities in the
coaching or management ranks at all levels of competitive sports
and the many years it took before African-American men and wo-
men joined the ranks of sportscasters? Racist themes still heavily
because he has made a charge, testified, assisted, or participated in any
manner ... under this subchapter.
Id.
177. Id.
178. See Mahajan, supra note 103, at 167-68 (discussing biases in employment
based on physical appearance).
179. See id. (describing role of physical and behavioral traits in employment).
180. See Roberts & Roberts, supra note 102, at 369-70. (explaining cultural
discrimination in workplace).
181. NFL Scouting Combine, NFL.coM, http://www.nfl.com/combine (last
visited Sept. 3, 2008) (discussing potential draft choices in-depth).
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influence contemporary American sports, with many prevalent cog-
nitive biases promoting stereotypical portrayals of black and white
athletic characteristics and abilities.18 2
The Price Waterhouse Court and the 1991 Amendments have al-
ready begun incorporating cognitive bias into Title VII analysis by
recognizing mixed-motives, motivating factor and stereotyping. A
very expansive reading of Price Waterhouse would consider any stere-
otyping whatsoever a violation of Title VII and all appearance codes
discriminatory since they are all based at least in part on social con-
structs of what is acceptable gender appearance. Disciplining men
for wearing dresses and make-up to work, for instance, would thus
violate Title VII.183
Most courts have of course rejected such an expansive reading
because it would ignore community norms and disregard the em-
ployer's rights over his workplace,18 4 while still recognizing that cer-
tain socially acceptable standards and community norms in dress
codes may in fact include and perpetuate racist and sexist perspec-
tives'8 5 and their related harms.1 8
6
2. A Cognitive Bias Continuum
The legal understanding of motive and intent should be ex-
panded to include a cognitive bias continuum that begins with rela-
tively neutral proxies and ends with clearly intentional
prejudices. 187 In short, the degree of negativity, its association with
a protected class and the influence of that association on the em-
ployment decision all increase as one progresses on the spectrum
from proxy to stereotype to bias to prejudice. Proxies, stereotypes,
182. See Jeffrey A. Williams, Flagrant Foul: Racism in "The Ron Artest Fight," 13
UCLA ENT. L. REv. 55, 62 (2005) (describing African-American stars stereotyped
as "fast or strong" and white stars as "intelligent" or "good leaders").
183. See Smith v. City of Salem, Ohio, 378 F.3d 566, 572 (6th Cir. 2004) (hold-
ing that Title VII provides transsexuals with claim for relief).
184. Kleinsorge v. Eyeland Corp., No. 00-1180, 2000 WL 124559, at *3 (E.D.
Pa. Jan. 31, 2000) (upholding validity of dress code that prohibited earrings on
males, but permitted them for females).
185. See Alexis Conway, Comment, Leaving Employers in the Dark: What Consti-
tutes a Lawful Appearance Standard after Jespersen v. Harrah's Operating Co. ?, 18 GEO.
MASON U. Civ. RTS. LJ. 107, 127 (2007) (arguing that courts fail to critically ex-
amine social norms built on stereotypes).
186. See Tristin K. Green, Discomfort at Work: Workplace Assimilation Demands
and the Contact Hypothesis, 86 N.C. L. Riv. 379, 380 (2008) (describing how assimila-
tion negatively affects social equality).
187. See Linda Hamilton Krieger, The Content of Our Categories: A Cognitive Bias
Approach Discrimination and Equal Employment Opportunity, 47 STAN. L. REv. 1161,
1185 (1995) ("[Clognitive forms of intergroup bias affect decisionmaking at all
points along a perceptual / inferential /judgmental continuum.").
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biases or prejudices may be further delineated as either conscious
or unconscious, rational or irrational. These classifications provide
for a more accurate assessment of the harms and appropriate
remedies.
3. NBA Dress Code: Proxy, Stereotype, Bias or Prejudice?
It is illogical to presume that the NBA instituted a Dress Code
out of animus for the very players who sustain it. More likely, it
arose due to some level of cognitive bias interacting with concerns
about the league's deteriorating image and brand - to which the
players are directly linked. These less racially volatile motives have
much more to do with the desire to protect and cultivate the
league's revenue stream, which is based significantly on image and
branding, than it has to do with any prejudice or bias against its
players. Since the days of Magic Johnson and Larry Bird, the NBA's
success seemed especially conditioned on the image of its individ-
ual players. This dynamic, of course, was personified to perfection
in one of the greatest stars in modem sports history - Michael Jor-
dan. League, team and individual compensation elevated during
Jordan's time in the same manner that he elevated during games.
This star culture and the high-profile of its African-American popu-
lation adds to the delicate nature of any discrimination against
those members.
The predominantly white management of the NBA interpreted
its image problems as caused, at least in part, by the negative bi-
ases'88 associated with the urban backgrounds, youthfulness, race,
styles and expressions of many NBA players.' 8 9 These racial
prejudices, held by fans, media and owners to varying degrees
boiled over in Michigan on November 19, 2004 during the game-
ending fight between players and fans of the Detroit Pistons and
the Indiana Pacers. For certain people with racially blurred vision,
the fight that began on the court among the players and ended in
the stands among fans was caused by the overpaid, lazy black play-
188. See Chris Palmer, Crisis of Perception, ESPN.coM, http://sports.espn.go.
com/espnmag/story?id=3243624 (last visited Sept. 18, 2008) (noting racial percep-
tions contribute to NBA image problem); Michael Lee, NBA Fights to Regain Image,
WASH. POST, Nov. 19, 2005, at El, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/
wpdyn/content/article/2005/11/18/AR2005111802752.html (noting NBA image
problem after Pistons-Pacers brawl).
189. See NBA Survey Results, http://www.nba.com/news/survey-age-2004.
html#bottom (last visited Sept. 18, 2008). The average age of NBA players was
twenty-seven years old in 2004-05, with most in their twenties, and three-quarters of
them are African-American. Id.
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ers fighting with the hard-working, paying white fans. 190 Those
with a more lucid and unbiased vision realized that a variety of soci-
ological and psychological issues converged to energize that violent
eruption.19 1
4. Rational or Irrational?
The Piston/Pacer brawl combined with a slew of off-field mis-
conduct in a variety of sports to create major concerns over league
and player image, fan interest, television ratings and game attend-
ance. 192 This context served as the backdrop during the collective
bargaining talks in 2005, after which the NBA Dress Code was
adopted. The commissioner implemented the Dress Code by in-
voking the CBA's best interests of the game clause in order to pro-
mote a more professional image. 193 The NBA Dress Code was
influenced to some degree by the image issues, racial and other-
wise, that confronted the league and its players at that time. Ac-
cordingly, any legal analysis should recognize that the policy
contained some degree of cognitive bias towards race - which was
at least a motivating factor under the traditional mixed-motive stan-
dard of Title VII.1 94 In fact, this author classifies it as a relatively
rational, yet pejorative prejudice resulting in a detrimental policy to
the players.
Appearance issues are not new to the NBA. The 1990's saw
shorts, shoes, jerseys, jewelry, haircuts and body art all make visible
impressions on the league's image. But it was the league's inconsis-
tent response to these fashions that raised questions about an NBA
faux pas. As the longer and baggier NBA shorts grew in style and
190. See Williams, supra note 181, at 76-80 (describing Arrest avoiding fight at
first and having beer thrown on him by white fan, John Green, whom prosecutors
view as responsible for fight in stands); see also ClickonDetroit, Report: Fan in White
Hat has Criminal History, Nov. 22, 2004, http://www.clickondetroit.com/sports/39
38054/detail.html (explaining fan who threw cup could face criminal charges).
191. See ClickonDetroit, Report: Fan in White Hat has Criminal History, Nov. 22,
2004, http://www.clickondetroit.com/sports/3938054/detail.html (describing
white fan targeting passive Ron Artest with cup of beer to ignite fighting frenzy).
192. See Wood, supra note 41.
193. See NBA Players Association Collective Bargaining Agreement: Article
XXXI, § 8, http://www.nbpa.com/cba-articles/article-XXXI.php#section8 (last
visited Oct. 16, 2008) (stating player discipline procedures). Section 8 of the CBA
covers "action taken by the Commissioner... concerning the preservation of the
integrity of, or the maintenance of public confidence in, the game of basketball
. See id.; see also NBA Dress Code, supra note 2.
194. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 244 n.9 (1989) (majority
opinion) (expanding Title VII to prohibit discrimination rooted in gender stereo-
types associated with protected class of sex and "with equal force to discrimination
based on race, religion, or national origin [stereotypes]").
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acceptance, the league marketed the larger sizes, while simultane-
ously fining "several players for wearing shorts too far below their
knees." 19 5 The league seemed to afford greater tolerance for
throwback jerseys, shoes, jewelry, hair-styles and tattoos. But a line
has always been drawn in the sand, as restrictions existed as to the
color of shoes (must match the uniform), the type of jewelry (not
loose during games) and even tattoos.19 6 Even the venerable Mr.
Jordan was not exempt from NBA appearance rules. The NBA
once "threatened [him with] a $1,000 fine for violating uniform
policies requiring shoes show only the major team colors."19 7
As the initial commotion over the 2005 NBA Dress Code
seemed to subside, the integrity of sports in general and basketball
in particular were hit hard again during the 2007-2008 seasons. In
addition to track and baseball's steroid scandals, one basketball ref-
eree was accused of betting on games he worked, while other refer-
ees were found to call more fouls on players of the opposite race.19 8
Thus, white referees whistle more fouls on black players and black
referees call more fouls on white players. A related study found
Major League Baseball umpires suffer from a similar form of color
blindness or bias.199 These examples of affinity towards players of
the same race reinforce the role that cognitive biases, whether ra-
tional or irrational, can play in the workplace through things such
as grooming policies. They also seem to support a determination
that the NBA Dress Code was both rational and conscious in its
bias.
5. Conscious or Unconscious Bias
The "excluded items" in the NBA Dress Code triggered con-
cerns about a deeper discrimination and the league's inherent bias,
while also displaying a slight hypocrisy, because it now restricted the
elements of urban, hip-hop culture that it once promoted and em-
195. Williams, supra note 181, at 67 (citingJon Eligon, In NBA Clothes Dress Up
the Image, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 19, 2005, at D5) (discussing NBA issued fines for baggy
shorts).
196. See Williams, supra note 181, at 66 (describing uniform restrictions and
symbiotic marketing relationship between NBA and Nike that started with Air Jor-
dan shoes).
197. Id.
198. SeeJoseph Price &Justin Wolfers, Racial Discrimination among NBA Referees
(Nat'l Bureau Of Economic Research, Working Paper No. 13206, 2007).
199. See Ciara Byrne, Umpires Show Racial Prejudice, Study Reveals, CANWEsT
NEWS SERVICE (Aug. 13, 2007), available at http://www.canada.com/topics/sports/
story.html?id=58f434c5-ce2l-4cd8-9c62-c838ae722856&k=78486 (reporting study
that suggests umpires give preference to pitchers of their own race).
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braced. 200 In the season prior to the dress code year, the NBA
aired promotional commercials featuring comedian Sacha Baron
Cohen as his Ali G character "dressed in a tracksuit accessorized by
large, bulky chains, while donning a skullcap and wraparound sun-
glasses. '20 1 The selection of Ali G is riddled with racial overtones
since Cohen's character satirizes white culture's fascination with
hip-hop culture, even though he is not black himself. The NBA
consciously "affiliated itself with the hip-hop industry, and commer-
cialized a cultural authenticity closely associated with race." 202 The
league marketed an image or brand with known racial overtones,
which played positively, yet precariously on "the elementary power
of stereotyping" and "exploitation of subconscious biases shared by
a portion of the respective industry markets" for financial gain. 203
It was with the same awareness of proxies, stereotypes, prejudices
and biases that the NBA instituted its dress code.
The context, language and prohibitory elements of the Dress
Code rendered its implementation to be a much more harmful
conscious prejudice than a less harmful stereotype.
"[T] his form of commercial racism is just as real and, particu-
larly in the case of popular professional sports, just as danger-
ous."204 The danger lies in the negative stereotypes and biases (i.e.,
players are immature and uneducated) 20 5 associated with the urban
backgrounds, youthfulness, race, styles and expressions of NBA
players that certain constituents usually (and the NBA sometimes)
frown upon.20 6 This sort of behavior stigmatizes black players,
which reinforces stereotypes and biases that then further assimila-
tion and subordination in the workplace and society.
And just when everyone thought all was well in the NBA with
the return of the Lakers and Celtics to the NBA Finals, NBA Com-
missioner David Stern raised the racist flag again by fining Celtic
Paul Pierce for allegedly making a "menacing gesture" of a gang
200. See Williams, supra note 181, at 75-76 (suggesting that league sanctions
perpetuate racist social norms).
201. McCann, supra note 106, at 828.
202. See Williams, supra note 181, at 75.
203. Id.
204. Id. at 75-76.
205. See McCann, supra note 106, at 821 ("NBA players tend to be wrongly
identified as immature, out-of-control, and hopelessly uneducated.").
206. See NBA Survey Results, supra note 188. The average age of NBA players
was twenty-seven years old in the 2004-2005 season, with most players in their twen-
ties. See id.
2009]
37
Bandsuch: The NBA Dre  Code and other Fashion Faux Pas Under Title VII
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2009
38 VILLANOVA SPORTS & ENT. LAW JOURNAL
sign at the opposing team's bench.20 7 The finger gesture (in the
shape of an OK or B) has multiple interpretations, with Pierce and
others adamantly denying the gang implications. 20 8 Commissioner
Stern was the architect behind the NBA Dress Code and the judge
behind the Pierce discipline. The NBA's actions further betray a
conscious racial bias, exemplifying an ugly form of "trait discrimina-
tion" that is harmful to the individuals in the protected class, to
sports leagues and to society overall.
B. Affirmative Defenses209
If the employer's requisite intent, employee's adverse impact
and the relative connection of each to a protected class exists, then
a prima facie case of unlawful employment discrimination under
Title VII is established. The courts then turn to the affirmative de-
fenses 210 to see if the defendant's intent can be legitimized, or the
policy, action or decision can be justified based on the importance
of the reason, its degree of necessity and any other mitigating
factors. 211
Title VII articulates an affirmative defense to single-intent dis-
parate treatment, excusing it "in those certain instances where [the
class itself of] religion, sex, or national origin is a BFOQ reasonably
necessary to the normal operation of that particular business or en-
terprise."212 Customer concerns about bodily privacy are often at
207. See Kurt Streeter, Commissioner David Stern Sends Wrong Signal with Punish-
ment of Celtics' Paul Pierce, L.A. TIMES, May 11, 2008, at DI (explaining that Paul
Pierce has donated money to clean up his former neighborhood, Inglewood, CA,
from gang activity).
208. See id. (explaining that Pierce's hand gesture could have meant many
things).
209. See Bandsuch, supra note 82 (forthcoming Oct. 2009).
210. See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802-03 (1973)
(holding after plaintiff establishes prima facie case, employer has burden of prov-
ing "legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for ... employee's rejection"); see also
Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prod., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 147 (2000) (noting that
under Title VII's three-prong approach, Plaintiff-employee may rebut all defen-
dant's articulated defenses by proving reasons given were really nothing more than
pretext used to hide fact of purposeful discrimination). But see St. Mary's Honor
Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 515-16 (1993) (holding that proof of pretext does not
necessitate that judgment be rendered for plaintiff-employee since all circum-
stances can be considered).
211. See David B. Cruz, Pursuing Equal Justice in the West: Making up Women:
Casinos, Cosmetics and Title VII, 5 NEV. L.J. 240, 244 (Fall 2004) (arguing that BFOQ
should apply only to decision to hire someone, but not to terms or conditions of
employment, yet acknowledging this narrow reading is not utilized by courts) (cit-
ing Knott v. Mo. Pac. R.R., 527 F.2d 1249 (8th Cir. 1975)); see also Fagan v. Nat'l
Cash Register Co., 481 F.2d 1115, 1126 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (validating different hair
length requirements as BFOQ).
212. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e)(1) (2000).
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the source of the BFOQ exception for sex,213 yet even bodily pri-
vacy does not guarantee a BFOQ if there exists another way to mini-
mize encroachment upon the customer's privacy. 2 14 Furthermore,
race is never a valid BFOQ2 15 and thus is inapplicable to the NBA
Dress Code.
Another defense to single-intent (pretext) discrimination rec-
ognized by the courts is when the employer's decision was based on
a legitimate alternative business reason ("LABR").216 The alterna-
tive business reason does not excuse employers from liability for
mixed-motive discrimination unless the LABR was the only reason
for the policy.2 17 It follows that, as valid as the reasons behind the
NBA Dress Code may be, they do not fully excuse the policy's inher-
ent cognitive bias.
Defendant-employers are also afforded limited statutory pro-
tections when they "would have taken the same action in the ab-
sence of the impermissible motivating factor."218 The "would have"
defense is limited in that the defendant-employer may utilize it only
to reduce the employee's available remedies, not to escape overall
liability.21 9
213. See Sharon M. McGowan, The Bona Fide Body: Title VIl's Last Bastion of
Intentional Sex Discrimination, 12 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 77, 99 (2003) (noting
courts have upheld sex discrimination based partially upon customer preference).
214. See Olson v. Marriott Int'l, Inc., 75 F. Supp. 2d 1052, 1060-69 (D. Ariz.
1999) (deciding that being female was not BFOQ of holding massage therapist
position).
215. See Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 334 (1977) (holding that BFOQ
defense should be narrowly construed).
216. See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802-03 (1973) (es-
tablishing prima facie case shifts burden to defendant to prove legitimate, non-
discriminatory business reason); see also Tex. Dep't of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450
U.S. 248, 255-56 (1981) (describing that these legitimate reasons must be set out
clearly).
217. See Burdine, 450 U.S. at 253 (noting that if plaintiff proves prima facie
case, burden shifts to defendant "to articulate some legitimate, nondiscriminatory
reason for the employee's rejection").
218. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (2) (B) (2000) (providing court with discretion re-
garding awarding damages when defendant would have taken same action even
without impermissible motivating factor).
219. See id. § 2000e-2, 5(g) (2) (B) (i)-(ii) (allowing defendant to escape rehir-
ing or paying damages to plaintiff when presenting legitimate other reason, but al-
lowing court in its discretion to award declaratory relief, limited injunctive relief
and attorney's fees and costs). The defendant arguably can still fully overcome the
prima facie case, but only by proving that the defendant's decision was based actu-
ally and solely on a legitimate nondiscriminatory business reason (which would es-
sentially repudiate even the existence of a mixed-motive). See id. § 2000e-
5(g) (2) (B) (i)-(ii).
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Under the Civil Rights Act of 1991, Congress codified the dis-
parate impact theory220 and its exclusive affirmative defense of
business necessity221 - which requires defendant-employer to
demonstrate 222 that the business practice was 'job related to the
position in question" and "consistent with business necessity."223
For instance, in its effort to "present a clean, neat environment,"
Starbucks "requires employees to cover all tattoos and remove cer-
tain piercings."224 Customer and co-worker preferences, however,
are not valid reasons when the preferences themselves are prejudi-
cial and not based on safety, privacy or image. 225
The 1991 Amendments to Title VII also placed some responsi-
bility on the employer to reasonably accommodate the employees
since an additional rebuttal is available if the plaintiff shows that a
reasonable alternative employment practice with less unfavorable
consequences was known and rejected by the employer in favor of
the practice in dispute.226 Similarly, in religious or disability dis-
crimination cases the defendant need not accommodate employees
when doing so would be an unreasonable and undue hardship.2 27
When an employee wanted to wear an eyebrow ring, which was pro-
tected by her membership in the Church of Body Modification, in
220. See id. § 2000e-2(k)-(n) (permitting claimants to demonstrate employ-
ment practices cause disparate impact). This revived, or codified, the disparate
impact theory, which two years earlier was practically eliminated by the same Court
which first founded it as a viable theory of discrimination. SeeWards Cove Packing
Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642, 653-55 (1989) (holding that racial imbalance, without
more, does not establish Title VII prima facie case).
221. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (k) (1) (A) (i) (stating that business necessity de-
fense applies only to disparate impact cases).
222. See id. § 2000e(m) ("The term 'demonstrates' means meets the burdens
of production and persuasion."). Congress clarified that in disparate impact cases,
the burden of proof shifts throughout the three prongs. See id. § 2000e-2(k) (1)
(establishing requirements of burden of proof for disparate impact).
223. Id. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(i).
224. Mary Jo Feldstein, Piercing, Tattoos Create Workplace Issues, REuTERs, June
23, 2001, available at http://www.rense.com/generallI/plac.htm (explaining that
piercing and tattoos challenge workplace dress codes).
225. See id.
226. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(j)-(k) (2000) (stating that if employer refuses to
adopt alternative employment practice, it is disparate treatment). An "undue
hardship" is anything more than a minor, or "de minimis," burden on the em-
ployer's business. See Ansonia Bd. of Educ. v. Philbrook, 479 U.S. 60, 67 (1986)
(holding courts need not consider prima facie case or accommodations when
there is undue hardship). Even in Sabbath cases, an undue burden is created
when the scheduling accommodation would disrupt a variety of other employees
work schedules, contradict a seniority system or violate a collective bargaining
agreement. See Trans World Airlines v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63, 84-85 (1977) (find-
ing that religious accommodations in this case would cause undue hardship).
227. See Trans World Airlines, 432 U.S. at 84-85 (accommodating employees in
this case would be undue hardship).
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contravention of Costco's appearance policy, the First Circuit held
that Costco did not have a duty to accommodate such an employee
"because it could not do so without undue hardship. '" 228 The court
validated professionalism in appearance as a legitimate business ne-
cessity that overcame the religious accommodation by conceding
that allowing such jewelry would "influence[ ] Costco's public im-
age and, in Costco's calculation, detract[ ] from its professional-
ism." 22 9 This offers help against any future challenges by players to
the NBA Dress Code based upon religious grounds while also pro-
viding insight into deeper racial issues. In the Costco case, the
court emphasized that accommodation went both ways and that
"the employee has a duty to cooperate with the employer's good
faith efforts to accommodate" an employee's religious beliefs. 230
The common legal theme that certain harms should be given
more weight, or rather, certain rights should be given more protec-
tion exists in both the Title VII defenses and in its sister statutes. 23 1
This is accomplished by looking at the importance of the reason
behind the rule or policy and the necessity of the rule in bringing
about its stated purpose.
Instead of a bright-line, specific-standard, litmus-test approach
to justifying the business purpose behind a given appearance pol-
icy, the courts should consider the importance of the business rea-
son and its relatedness to the job or objective, as well as the
existence and ease of possible alternatives. The courts could derive
an overall weighted value for the business reason by looking at the
importance of the rule's objective and the rule's ability to achieve
228. Cloutier v. Costco Wholesale Corp., 390 F.3d 126, 128 (1st Cir. 2004)
(holding no duty to accommodate employee because it would cause undue
hardship).
229. Id. at 135 (finding as established that employees reflect on their busi-
ness). See generally Alison Stein Wellner, Costco Piercing Case Puts a New Face on The
Issue of Wearing Religious Garb at Work, 84 WORKFORCE MANAGEMENT 77 (2005),
available at http://www.allbusiness.com/management/3494872-1.html (analyzing
Cloutier's effect on employers).
230. Cloutier, 390 F.3d at 131.
231. SeeJackson v. Birmingham Bd. of Educ., 544 U.S. 167, 189-90 (2005)
(explaining that private cause of action under Title IX for intentional sex discrimi-
nation is not precluded by Title VII); see also Middlesex County Sewage Ass'n v.
Nat'l Sea Clammers Ass'n, 453 U.S. 1, 11 (1981) (holding Federal Water Pollution
Control Act and Marine Protection, Research and Sanctuaries Act of 1972 do not
authorize implied right of action). Depending on the protected status of the em-
ployee, discrimination claims could be brought under the ADEA, the ADA, the
Equal Pay Act, the NLRA, Title IX, Title II, the Religious Freedom Restoration Act,
The Federal Tort Claims Act, The Free Exercise, Freedom of Speech, Equal Pro-
tection, Due Process Clauses, sections 1981 and 1983, the applicable CBA, or cer-
tain state discrimination laws.
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it. The court then determines if together the rule justifies the ad-
verse impact it inflicts upon the protected class. Therefore, the less
serious the harm, the less related or necessary the rule may need to
be. Conversely, the more serious the harm, the more important
and related the business reason should be for justification.
C. The NBA's Business Reason
For years, commissioners restricted the exercise of their powers
to matters that were related directly to competition or disputes be-
tween players and teams. Nevertheless, a slew of off-field miscon-
duct has led commissioners, along with the support of the owners
and leagues, to enhance their powers and broaden the circum-
stances under which they impose penalties.
Unfortunately, the police blotter at times has read like an All-
Star team with Ray Lewis charged with murder in 2000, Peter War-
rick with grand theft in 2000 and Kobe Bryant with rape in 2003.
The Fall of 2004 unleashed the infamous Pacers' Brawl, and the
following months were dotted with player arrests for domestic vio-
lence, gun possession, drug use and drunken driving. The same
year Michael Vick was convicted of organizing a dog fighting ring
and sent to federal prison, Adam "Pacman" Jones was suspended
for the entire 2007 NFL season after being arrested over five times
in three years.232 The NHL had its own problems with gambling,
assaults, and its lost season of 2004-2005. All of these have created
major concerns over league and player image, fan interest, televi-
sion ratings and game attendance, prompting each league to in-
crease commissioner authority in some form. For example, under
its new Personal Conduct Policy, the NFL expanded the commis-
sioner's right to discipline players for almost any off-field conduct,
significantly expanding his authority beyond the previous violent
crime policy, which required a conviction or plea in order to inter-
vene or discipline.233
The NBA similarly suffers severe image problems from both
on-court and off-court behavior which has unfortunately been
linked to stereotypical notions of a certain subset of the African-
American community.234 This has also led to decreased attendance
232. See Wood, supra note 41 (discussing Jones' legal troubles and plea deal).
233. See Michael McCann, Does the NFL's New Personal Conduct Policy Afford the
Commissioner Too Much Discretion?, SPORTS LAW BLOC, Apr. 18, 2007, http://sports-
law.blogspot.com/2007/04/does-nfls-new-personal-conduct-policy.html (question-
ing if Commissioner has too much power over personal conduct issues).
234. See, e.g., Stephen A. Smith, We Know Howard Can play, but There's Little
Value in What He Has to Say, ESPN.coM, Sept. 18, 2008, http://sports.espn.go.com/
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at NBA games. 235 The visibility of the league, because of media cov-
erage and its resultant social impact, further increases the impor-
tance of the rule. Customer preference and business image are
valid, but not absolute defenses under Title VII, albeit quite sub-
stantial under the current image concerns confronting the NBA
and sports in general.
The NBA Dress Code seems designed to promote professional-
ism, repair a damaged image and reconstruct a more favorable
brand all in the hope of customer satisfaction, television ratings and
overall league revenue. It is understandable, albeit not laudable, to
many that the NBA owners and executives would implement prac-
tices and policies like a dress code to recapture their previous suc-
cess or even sustain their current reputation.
236
Requiring players to wear three-piece suits is a form of impres-
sion management meant to enhance business and to counteract
previous images of Ron Artest running into the stands or of a tat-
tooed Allen Iverson standing on the sidelines adorned with baseball
cap, throwback jersey and gold medallions. Studies validate this
perspective by finding that dress codes may facilitate professional
behavior and promote a more favorable image to customers.
237
Some appearance rules promote homogeneity and conformity in
an effort to increase trust, fairness, loyalty and performance.
238
Conventional business wisdom advises that dressing more formally
for work may increase productivity, professionalism, reputation,
creativity and performance. Under the law, while none of these can
justify a discriminatory action by itself, they can be considered as
containing probative value depending on the supporting statistical
evidence, industry studies and expert testimony.
239
nba/columns/story?columnist=smith-stephen&page=jhoward-08091 8 (discussing
Dallas MaverickJosh Howard's scorn for national anthem and lack of comment by
NBA, other players and owners). During the national anthem, Howard told a cell-
phone camera, "I don't celebrate this [expletive]. I'm black.. . ." Id.
235. See Williams, supra note 181, at 85 (noting Pistons - Pacers brawl dam-
aged ticket sales).
236. See Gregg Easterbrook, Why NFL Coaches Should Wear Pajamas, and 96% of
the Universe Finally Found!, NFL.coM, Oct. 25, 2005, http://www.nfl.com/news/
story/9002 7 95 (noting NFL's dress code requires players and coaches to wear team
and league garb at times, instead of dress attire in order to protect and promote
NFL licensing purchases and agreements).
237. See Anat Rafaeli et al., Navigating Attire: The Use of Dress by Female Executive
Employees, 40 AcAD. MGMT. REv. J. 9, 21 (1997) (studying effects of dress on female
administrative support staff).
238. See Mahajan, supra note 103, at 175-76 (explaining that promoting homo-
geneity through dress is another form of discrimination).
239. See Corbett, supra note 111, at 163-69 (explaining belief that appearance-
discrimination law is unlikely to be passed).
2009]
43
Bandsuch: The NBA Dress Code and other Fashion Faux Pas Under Title VII
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2009
44 VILLANOVA SPORTS & ENT. LAW JOURNAL
Title VII, like its constitutional counterparts, should also look
at the fit between the company rule and the business reason. The
courts can and should integrate the EEOC guidelines regarding val-
idation into its analysis about the job-relatedness and business ne-
cessity of the employer's policy. Content validity, construct validity
and criterion-related validity can all be part of the business reason
analysis; and they can be employed to varying degrees depending
on the level of infringement upon the protected class. 240 In gen-
eral, the job-relatedness, fit or necessity of the NBA rule in bringing
about the desired goals of image repair, customer satisfaction and
sales is on the lower end of the continuum. This is because the
behavior during the games is more directly related to image than
the outfit a player is wearing. The further removed the rules are
from the player's activity and place of actual performance or work,
the less important or necessary the business purpose behind the
dress code seems.
The cause of the image problems makes the reasons for the
rule more tenuous because they were related to off-court antics and
more about behaviors than appearance. Because the cause of the
image problems are related to off-court antics and concern behav-
iors more than appearance, it would seem more appropriate for the
NBA to institute disciplinary actions for the particular behaviors
about which they were concerned. This is precisely what the NBA
did. For example, the referees were instructed to no longer toler-
ate the players' complaints after a whistle - and were authorized to
call a technical foul for behavior that reflected poorly on the overall
league image. The Commissioner also punished off-court wrongdo-
ings more seriously through fines and suspensions in an effort to
further address the image problems of the NBA.
In evaluating the necessity or fitness of the rule, reasonable al-
ternatives are also considered. The reasonableness of any alterna-
tive, like with reasonable accommodations, is determined by
looking at expense, ease of implementation and impact on opera-
tions.241 Mitigating factors may include the company's history of
prior discrimination, employment diversity record, cooperation
with the EEOC or the degree of notification to the employees
among others. The fact that reasonable alternatives to the NBA
240. See 29 C.F.R. § 1607 (2000) (stating uniform guidelines on employment
selection procedures).
241. See id. § 1630.2(o) (explaining reasonable accommodations for disabili-
ties address the "application process," performance of "essential functions," and
"equal benefits and privileges," or "providing accommodations beyond those re-
quired by this part.").
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Dress Code exist - moderation in jewelry as opposed to its com-
plete prohibition - also lowers the job-relatedness or necessity. Ad-
ditionally, the NBA has been helpful to the larger African-American
community with donations and services, which is a mitigating factor
to be considered when determining overall liability and later when
assigning a remedy. The cumulative business reasons behind the
NBA Dress Code, however, still do not seem to justify the adverse
impact it causes. The NBA Dress Code should thus be considered
an unlawful employment practice that discriminates in violation of
Title VII.2 42
The result of finding the NBA Dress Code discriminatory
would most likely conflict with the three-pronged approach of Mc-
Donnell Douglas and its dress code progeny. Under the traditional
approach, the courts would apply the immutability/mutability stan-
dard, most likely rendering the rule outside of the protected class
status and not having much of an adverse affect.243 The dress code
bias against African-Americans would satisfy a mixed-motive prima
facie case, but unlikely single-intent. Although the BFOQ defense
is never available for race, the NBA would avail itself of the alterna-
tive legitimate nondiscriminatory business reason. In this case, the
business reasons are to promote professionalism, preserve decorum
and maintain its business image. Courts have upheld business im-
age as a legitimate nondiscriminatory affirmative defense.
244
Though customer and co-worker preference would buttress that po-
sition, they are not absolute defenses. 245 Under the ensuing mixed-
motive analysis, the players would need some proof of pretext to
overcome the NBA's rationale. Unfortunately for the NBA players,
it would be difficult considering the league's 80% minority employ-
ment rate and its overall support of the African-American
community.
242. See Fisk, supra note 72, at 1126-27 (analyzing whether dress codes are
invasion of privacy). Fisk and others recommend shifting the burden of proof back
and forth between employee and employer similar to the current state of Title VII
for both disparate impact and mixed-motive cases. See id. Although clear and con-
vincing evidence is required for affirmative defenses against claims of retaliation
under Sarbanes-Oxley, both the Supreme Court and Congress have clearly re-
jected the standard for Title VII cases. See id.
243. See Rogers v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 527 F. Supp. 229, 231 (S.D.N.Y. 1981)
(holding that hairstyle restrictions were not discriminatory).
244. See id. at 233 (describing that policies may be adopted to help project
certain business image and this serves as bona fide business purpose).
245. See 29 C.F.R. § 1604.2(a) (1) (iii) (1972) (stating that coworker, employer,
client and customer preferences do not justify BFOQ); see also Rucker v. Higher
Educ. Aid Bd., 669 F.2d 1179, 1181-82 (7th Cir. 1982) (concluding it is improper
to base employment decisions on customer preference).
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D. Remedies
The full gamut of remedies should be made available to the
courts in all Title VII cases. In the same way that the Civil Rights
Act of 1991 allowed the courts, in their discretion, to award declara-
tory relief and limited injunctive relief,246 the determination of the
appropriate remedies should also be placed within the discretion of
the court.
Critics question the wisdom of giving courts this much discre-
tion since they are equally subject to prejudicial perspectives and
cognitive bias. Yet, judges still seem to be in the best position to
address these concerns and overcome their biases on a case-by-case
basis. As Justice Marshall stated, as "[t] o this task judges are well
suited, for the lessons of history and experience are surely the best
guide as to when, and with respect to what interests, society is likely
to stigmatize individuals as members of an inferior caste or view
them as not belonging to the community. '247
If the NBA Dress Code was officially found to be discrimina-
tory, the courts could easily enjoin parts or all of the dress code,
then award costs to the employees. The courts should also consider
whether some sort of reasonable accommodation can be reached.
This would allow the courts to carve out remedies, exceptions or a
reasonable accommodation for the burdened individuals without
necessarily nullifying the entire policy. The NBA has already evi-
denced the ability to do so when they accommodated Mahmoud
Abdul-Rauf's Islamic practices by allowing him to pray to himself
while standing during the national anthem after first fining and sus-
pending him. 248
The NBA and other businesses should anticipate this approach
by developing dress codes as a collaborative project with their em-
ployees and use their perspectives and insights in forming new
rules. This collaborative approach seems quite fitting for a union-
ized workplace like the NBA, which also experiences a wide cultural
gap between white management and black players.
246. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (2) (B) (i) (2000) (stating what relief courts
may grant when race, color, religion, sex or national origin are motivating factors
in employers' actions).
247. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 472 n.24 (1985)(Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
248. See Diamos, surpa note 126 (reporting on controversy behind Abdul-
Rauf's choice not to stand during National Anthem).
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VI. CONCLUSION
Professional baseball, football and basketball were all segre-
gated at one time, mirroring society and employment prejudices,
yet it was these very sports that broke down many racial barriers and
biases by integrating competition and teams. Business and sports
continue to reveal society's soul, reflecting the beauty of the human
person's skills, intelligence and emotions, while also exposing the
ugliness of its violence, corruption, and racism. The integral role of
sports and business in society provide them both with a unique op-
portunity to actually influence and shape society's values, including
those towards discrimination. Accordingly, appearance rules and
grooming policies, like the NBA Dress Code, provide employers
and leagues with a perfect vehicle for integrating and balancing the
diverse cultural expressions of their employees with the traditional
goals of professional appearance.
Recently, in January 2006, history was made by a simple hand-
shake between two black men. Tony Dungy and Lovie Smith, the
head football coaches of the two Super Bowl teams, shook hands
after the Colts victory over the Bears in front of 70,000 spectators
and millions more television viewers around the globe. The world
was witnessing another defining moment for race relations in sport
comparable to Jesse Owens' 1936 Olympics and Jackie Robinson's
first-at-bat in 1947. These are moments which give hope to the ide-
als of equal-opportunity and mutual respect for all peoples, upon
which this country was founded and the Civil Rights Act endeavors
to secure.
249
249. See Robert C. Post, Prejudicial Appearances: The Logic of American Anti-Dis-
crimination Law, 88 CAL. L. REv. 1, 9, 16 (2000) (describing justice WilliamJ. Bren-
nan Jr.'s differing approach to antidiscrimination law).
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